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The study explores the role of issue managers in the initial public offering (IPO) 
process. Empirical research shows that IPOs are associated with two significant market 
anomalies: short-run underpricing puzzle and long-run underperformance phenomenon. 
This paper examines the reputational influence of issue managers on the two anomalies. 
Employing the newly developed ‘twelve-month rolling’ reputation ranking approach, our 
study is the first to furnish a comprehensive ranking of all the issue managers with a 
substantial presence in Singapore.  
 
Based on a sample of 384 IPOs listed on the Singapore Exchange between 
January 1, 1997 and August 22, 2008, we find evidence of prevalent short-run 
underpricing and long-run underperformance in the domestic market. Our findings 
indicate that the IPOs backed by higher reputation issue managers are associated with 
greater short-run underpricing. This is consistent with the ‘market power hypothesis’ 
which postulates that higher reputation issue managers are able to generate greater market 
participation and higher market valuations in the immediate post-issue market. However, 
the reputational influence of issue managers diminishes with time. Beyond the twelve-
month return window, the issue manager reputation no longer has predictive power for 
the returns performance. Overall, the results suggest that the consideration of issue 
manager reputation profile is important if proper inferences on the IPO returns 
performance are to be drawn.  
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Chapter 1: Introduction 




1.1  BACKGROUND OF THE STUDY 
The initial public offering (IPO) is one of the fundamental tools in the world of 
corporate finance. Over the past decades, the market value of new stock issues burgeoned 
rapidly1  (Saunders and Cornett, 2001). Indeed, the rising popularity of IPOs among 
corporations has prompted immense attention from researchers in academia. Despite 
voluminous studies in this field to date, much remains to be explored.  In this study, we 
will focus on the reputational influence of issue managers in the IPO process. Specifically, 
we seek to find out the role that issue manager reputation has on two prevalent market 
anomalies namely the short-run underpricing puzzle and the long-run underperformance 
phenomenon. 
 
 Jones (1998) defines an anomaly as a ‘regular and predictable return pattern that 
is widely known, yet continues to exist’. The short-run underpricing anomaly is a 
‘persistent feature of the IPO market’ (Ritter and Welch, 2002) and definitely the ‘best-
known pattern associated with the process of going public’ (Ritter, 1998). As the term 
suggests, the underpricing phenomenon refers to the tendency that the offer price of new 
issues are generally set lower than the market-clearing price. This downward bias in the 
offer price results in the stock price of IPOs to appreciate sharply on the first day of 
                                                 
1
 According to statistical data published by the Federal Reserve, the annual issuance of new common stock 
in the U.S. almost tripled in volume over a short span of 15 years, from 57 billion dollars in 1992 to record 
heights of close to 148 billions of dollars in 2006. Please refer to various issues of the Federal Reserve 
Bulletin, Table 1.46. The website link is as follows: www.federalreseve.gov/Pubs/supplement/ 
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trading. Consequently, an investor who is allocated a share in the IPO is likely to earn 
positive abnormal return in the immediate secondary market. Various interpretations of 
this phenomenon will be put forth in Chapter 2. 
 
 Another anomaly that has attracted considerable attention is the long-run 
underperformance of IPOs. Extant literature documents that the IPO firms are able to 
successfully time the listings during market peaks so as to take advantage of the windows 
of opportunity to push for higher valuations. The attractive but unsustainable returns 
performance in the first few days of trading causes the IPO firms to underperform the 
market and industry peers over the longer-horizon. 
  
1.2  OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY 
An IPO refers to the first issue of securities by a company to the general public 
(Saunders and Cornett, 2001; Ross, et al., 2002). Since IPOs involve the sale of equities 
in closely-held firms, there is limited information available about the firms when they 
make their first appearances on the stock exchange (Jenkinson and Ljungqvist, 2001). 
The presence of widespread information asymmetries poses major challenges to the 
valuing of the IPOs. In a bid to reduce the amount of uncertainties and informational 
asymmetries between the firm insiders and outside investors, IPO firms engage financial 
intermediaries to certify and reassure investors that the offer prices are truly consistent 
with inside information (Booth and Smith, 1986; Ross, et al., 2002).  
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The reputational role of underwriters in the IPO process has come under the 
limelight in recent years. As an extension to existing literature, this study examines the 
impact of issue manager reputation on the underpricing and underperformance 
phenomena in the local market. Hitherto, empirical research on the role of issue managers 
based in Singapore is scant. Using a sample of 384 IPO firms that were listed on the 
Singapore Exchange (SGX) between January 1, 1997 and August 22, 2008, the paper 
seeks to achieve three objectives. 
 
First, the study attempts to shed new light to the literature by ranking the issue 
managers in accordance to their reputation profile via the newly developed ‘twelve-
month rolling’ reputation ranking approach. Next, the study aims to gain insights on the 
underpricing and underperformance phenomena in the domestic market through 
examining the pre-issue valuations and post-issue aftermarket stock performances of the 
IPO firms listed on SGX. Finally, by employing the conventional univariate sub-sample 
comparisons and multivariate regression analyses, the paper explores the association 
between the issue manager reputation profile and the abovementioned anomalies. 
Concluding the study, we endeavor to explain the reasons behind the findings and the 
implications involved. 
 
1.3  MOTIVATIONS OF THE STUDY 
The reputational role of underwriters in the IPO process has been a subject of 
much heated debate. While conventional wisdom suggests that the IPOs underwritten by 
high reputation investment banks are likely to display less underpricing and better long-
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run stock performances (see, among others, Carter and Manaster, 1990; Chemmanur and 
Fulghieri, 1994; Carter, et al., 1998), empirical evidence however indicates that the 
relation between underwriter reputation and IPO returns has undergone significant 
structural shifts in the second half of 1990s. Using recent data, Beatty and Welch (1996) 
and Loughran and Ritter (2004) posit that IPOs underwritten by high reputation 
underwriters are instead characterized by greater mispricing. This contradicts the widely 
known ‘certification hypothesis’ documented in the literature. Given the deviation in 
empirical findings, the reputational impact of underwriters presents an interesting area for 
in-depth research.   
 
To date, the bulk of the empirical studies examining the reputational role of 
underwriters have largely focused research efforts on the United States (U.S.). Significant 
differences in the economic conditions between Singapore and the U.S., coupled with the 
unique institutional framework of the local market, suggest that conclusions derived from 
the U.S-based empirical research might not exactly extend to the domestic context. With 
Singapore’s growing importance as a global financial hub, examining the reputational 
role of issue managers based in Singapore is an important first step to gaining a better 
understanding of the financial operations within the domestic IPO market. 
 
More significantly, the domestic financial sector has witnessed a series of large 
scale restructuring reforms in recent years. The liberalization of the banking and financial 
sector in the late 1990s prompted a wave of consolidation among the financial institutions, 
introducing steeper competition to the local investment banking industry. In light of these 
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reforms, we are motivated to examine whether the underpricing puzzle and long-run 
underperformance anomaly found in prior Singapore-based IPO studies continue to 
prevail in recent times.  
 
1.4  POTENTIAL CONTRIBUTIONS OF THE STUDY 
As discussed, there is a substantial body of U.S-based research examining the 
effects of underwriter reputation on the valuation and aftermarket stock returns 
performance of IPO firms. However, we are not aware of any study that investigates the 
reputational impact of issuer managers in Singapore. Using a newly developed ‘twelve-
month rolling’ reputation ranking approach, our study is the first to furnish a 
comprehensive ranking of all the issue managers with a substantial presence in the local 
IPO scene. Unlike previous Singapore-based IPO works that commonly use a simplified 
dummy variable specification for the underwriter reputation measure2, we propose a more 
intuitive approach that allows us to uncover the qualitative differences among issue 
managers of different reputation standings.  
 
In this paper, we examine the impact of issue manager reputation profile on the 
short-run underpricing and long-run underperformance phenomena in the Singapore IPO 
market. Consistent with previous studies, we find evidence of prevalent short-run 
underpricing and long-run underperformance in the domestic market. Specifically, our 
results suggest that higher reputation issue managers are able to generate greater market 
                                                 
2
 Reber and Fong (2006) uses a dummy variable specification for the underwriter reputation measure that is 
coded one to reflect the most reputable underwriter, Development Bank of Singapore Ltd (DBS) and zero 
otherwise. According to the researchers, DBS is used as the benchmark as it dominates the underwriting 
business. Individually, its market share accounts for more than forty percent of the entire domestic IPO 
market. 
   Chapter 1: Introduction 
Page 6  
participation and optimism among investors about the future prospects of the IPO firms. 
Correspondingly, IPOs engaging higher reputation issue managers have been observed to 
record larger initial returns and greater short-run underpricing. This is in line with the 
market power hypothesis put forth by Chemmanur and Krishnan (2007). Over time, the 
reputational impact of the issue managers however diminishes and no longer has 
predictive power for the returns performance beyond the twelve months cumulation 
period.     
 
Therefore, our study contributes to the existing literature in several ways. First, as 
an extension to previous Singapore-based IPO research, our results reaffirm the 
persistence of the short-run underpricing and long-run underperformance anomalies even 
in recent times. Notably, against the backdrop of periodic economic downswings, we are 
able to demonstrate that the two anomalies are generally robust to fluctuating economic 
conditions. Second, the study provides insights on the pricing policies of issue managers 
and their influence over the stock price performances of IPO firms. Specifically, through 
the data collected from the Singapore IPO market, we are able to scrutinize the influence 
of issue managers in a market that differs substantially from the U.S. both in terms of 
market size and level of sophistication. Given our findings of plausible signaling effects 
of the issue manager reputation in the local market, we would be able to draw useful 
inferences on the role of underwriters and issue managers based in other Asian 
economies with similar macroeconomic environment and institutional framework as that 
of Singapore. Finally, the study aims to provide readers with a holistic picture of the issue 
manager reputational impact on the performance of IPO firms. Understanding that 
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investors would be interested to know the short-run as well as long-run performances of 
IPOs, we track the daily stock price movements of each IPO firm up till its second 
anniversary. Overall, in terms of the sample size and the sampling period, this study can 
be considered as one with the largest coverage undertaken using Singapore data thus far3. 
 
1.5  ORGANIZATION OF THE STUDY 
 The remainder of the thesis is organized as follows. Chapter 2 reviews the past 
literature on the short-run underpricing puzzle and long-run underperformance 
phenomenon. This is accompanied by a brief account of the various studies on the 
reputational role of underwriters in IPO process. Chapter 3 describes the research design. 
It looks into the sample selection criteria and variable definition, and discusses the 
development of the hypotheses. Chapter 4 outlines the methodology. Chapter 5 highlights 
the empirical results. Chapter 6 concludes with the limitations of the study and provides 
suggestions for future research.  
                                                 
3
 The following is a list of some of the previous papers that have been done on the Singapore IPO market 
and a brief overview of the sample used: 
i) Reber and Fong (2006) use a sample of 100 IPOs listed between 1998 and 2000. 
ii) Tan, et al. (1999) use a sample of 82 IPOs listed between 1987 and 1993. 
iii) Firth and Liau-Tan (1997) use a sample of 114 IPOs listed between 1980 and 1993. 
iv) Koh and Walter (1989) use a sample of 70 IPOs listed between 1973 and 1987. 
v) Dawson (1987) uses a sample of 39 IPOs listed between 1978 and 1983. 
vi) Wong and Chiang (1986) use a sample of 48 IPOs listed between 1975 and 1984. 
vii) Koh and Tee (1985) use a sample of 62 IPOs listed between 1973 and 1984. 
viii) Dawson (1984) uses a sample of 29 IPOs listed between 1979 and 1983. 
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There has been extensive theoretical and empirical research on the initial public 
offering (IPO). In this chapter, we will review two well-documented anomalies in the 
IPO literature, namely the short-run underpricing puzzle and long-run underperformance 
phenomenon. As a prelude, the chapter begins with a brief account of the rise in 
popularity of IPOs among corporations in Section 2.2. Thereafter, we outline the 
literature developments of the two anomalies. Major milestones are highlighted and the 
explanations for each anomaly are discussed in Sections 2.3 and 2.4 respectively. This is 
followed by an overview of prior works on investment banks and their role in the IPO 
process. Finally, the chapter concludes with a summary of the more prominent works 
done on the Singapore IPO market thus far. 
 
2.2 RISE OF THE IPOs  
The bull market era of the 1960s witnessed the rising popularity of IPOs as an 
attractive investment instrument. During the ‘hot issue market’ of 1968 and 1969, Wall 
Street played host to a total of 2,171 IPOs within a short span of twenty-four months 
(Neuberger and Hammond, 1974). Over the years, the number of IPOs grew 
tremendously. In 1999 and 2000, the issuing volume in the United States reached sixty-
five billion dollars a year. The percentage of technology firms going public also soared, 
from about twenty-six percent in the 1980s to over seventy percent of the IPO market 
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during the Internet bubble period (Ritter and Welch, 2002). Undoubtedly, the buoyant 
IPO markets sparked heightened interest among researchers to unveil the mysteries of 
this rising phenomenon. Specifically, why do firms go public? 
 
Causal discussions on the motivations for IPO usually center on the need to raise 
equity capital and enhance the market liquidity for the stock (Ritter, 1998; Holmstrom 
and Tirole, 1993). Zingales (1995) is among the earliest researchers to formalize a theory 
to explain the going public decision. Based on a corporate control argument, the 
researcher postulates that the desire to maximize wealth through the sale of ‘control 
rights’ drives the incumbent to go public.  
 
Following the pioneering work by Zingales, numerous studies attempt to explain 
the going-public decision by examining the characteristics of the IPO firms. For instance, 
Lerner (1994), Pagano, et al. (1998) and Chemmanur and Fulghieri (1999) find that firms 
with larger capital requirements, higher market-to-book ratios and in industries with 
greater technology uncertainties are more likely to embark on IPOs. Summarizing the 
myriad of theoretical reasons proposed by various studies, Ritter and Welch (2002) posit 
that the decision to go public is pivotal on two most important concerns, that is, the life 
cycle stage of the company (Subrahmanyam and Titman, 1999; Maksimovic and Pichler, 
2001) and market conditions (Lucas and McDonald, 1990; Choe, et al., 1993). Indeed, 
the decision to go public involves multiple criteria, with the crux of the decision hinging 
on unique firm considerations, industry-specific factors as well as unpredictable 
macroeconomic environment (Ritter and Welch, 2002).  
Chapter 2: Literature Review 
  Page 10  
2.3  SHORT-RUN UNDERPRICING PUZZLE 
The IPO literature is populated with countless illustrations of new issues being 
underpriced (McCarthy, 1999; Ross, et al., 2002). One highly publicized example of 
underpricing is the case study of Netscape (listed on 9 August 1995). With an offer price 
of 28 dollars, Netscape’s stock price surged by 108 percent to close at 58.25 dollars on 
the first trading day (Ritter, 1998; Loughran and Ritter, 2002). Netscape is one example 
among the thousands of IPOs that bears testimony to the underpricing phenomenon.  
 
2.3.1  OVERVIEW OF PAST LITERATURE 
The short-run underpricing phenomenon has long puzzled financial economists. 
Early studies by Reilly and Hatfield (1969), Stoll and Curley (1970), Fisher and 
McDonald (1972) and Logue (1973) demonstrate that issuers have a tendency to set the 
offer price of new issues at below the market-clearing price. This downward bias in the 
offer price results in the stock price of IPOs to appreciate sharply on the first day of 
trading. Consequently, an investor who is allocated a share in the IPO is likely to earn 
positive abnormal return in the immediate post-issue market (Ibbotson, 1975; Krigman, et 
al., 1999; Ritter and Welch, 2002).  
 
Probing further, Barry, et al. (1998) reveal that the degree of underpricing varies 
widely across IPOs. Apart from differences in market capitalization, firm age and other 
firm characteristics (Loughran, et al., 1994), the contractual mechanism used in the IPO 
process also plays an instrumental role in determining the extent of the underpricing. By 
observing the relation between the offer price and initial filing range, Hanley (1993) 
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uncovers that IPOs that are priced above the initial filing range receive higher valuations 
in the immediate secondary markets than the rest of the IPOs. This suggests that issuers 
in the domestic market generally fail to fully incorporate the information on investor 
demand when setting the offer price, causing the stock price to rise considerably on the 
first day of trading (Lowry and Schwert, 2002). 
 
As a matter of fact, the underpricing phenomenon is not constrained to just the 
U.S. stock market. Beyond the U.S borders, IPO underpricing is prevalent in many 
countries. Isa (1993) and Husson and Jacquillat (1989) note that the magnitude of 
underpricing ranges from a meager four percent for French IPOs to almost eighty percent 
for Malaysian IPOs. While the extent of underpricing fluctuates substantially across 
various stock markets due to the disparity in institutional constraints, contractual 
mechanisms and firm characteristics (Loughran, et al., 1994), the resilience of the 
underpricing phenomenon, which has extended to nearly every nation, has displayed 
absolutely ‘no signs of its imminent demise’ (Ritter, 1998). 
 
2.3.2  POSSIBLE EXPLANATIONS 
Continuous research seeks to explain the persistence of the underpricing 
phenomenon. Providing first insights to this ‘mystery’ is the seminal paper by Ibboston 
(1975). The article sets the stage for subsequent studies to examine the underpricing 
puzzle in greater detail.  
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The explanations for the underpricing phenomenon can be broadly classified into 
two schools of thought (Ritter and Welch, 2002): the asymmetry information based 
school of thought proposed by Rock (1986), Benveniste and Spindt (1989) and Welch 
(1992) and the symmetry information based school of thought advocated by Tinic (1988), 
Boehmer and Fishe (2001) and Shiller (1988). Segregating the two schools of thought is 
the fine line hinging on researchers’ assumption made on the informational efficiency of 
the IPO market. We briefly discuss the two schools of thought below. 
 
2.3.2.1 ASYMMETRY INFORMATION BASED THEORIES 
Baron (1982), Parsons and Raviv (1985) argue that the IPO market is 
characterized by pronounced informational asymmetries. Pointing to the fact that IPO is 
the first issue of securities by a company to the general public (Saunders and Cornett, 
2001; Ross, et al., 2002), the amount of information available to the public about the IPO 
firm is thus very limited (Rao, 1993; Jenkinson and Ljungqvist, 2001). This, coupled with 
the adverse selection problem (Akerlof, 1970) and moral hazard issue (Holmstrom, 1979), 
aggravates the information scarcity situation, rendering the valuation of the IPO a major 
challenge.  
 
Recognizing that there is a general lack of information transfer between the pre-
issue owners and the investing public, Rock (1986) further postulates that the level of 
information possessed by different groups of investors is not uniformly distributed too. In 
his winner’s curse hypothesis, the researcher posits that the ability of the more informed 
investors to crowd out the uninformed investors from the good quality issues inevitably 
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results in the biased allocation of the good quality IPOs in favor of the more informed 
investors, leaving the remaining poor quality IPOs in the hands of the less informed 
individuals. By imputing a discount to the IPO price, issuers attempt to compensate the 
less informed investors for the inherent disadvantage they experience in the IPO market 
(Koh and Walter, 1989; Keloharju, 1993).  
 
Benveniste and Spindt (1989), Benveniste and Wilhelm (1990) and Spatt and 
Srivastava (1991) offer an alternative explanation to the underpricing phenomenon. 
Termed as the information revelation theory, the researchers rationalize that underpricing 
is an essential step to induce investors to truthfully reveal their expectations and 
information about the IPO firms during the bookbuilding process (Sherman, 2000). 
Consistent with the hypothesis, Hanley (1993) and Barry, et al. (1998) demonstrate that 
IPOs with upward revision in offer price are typically associated with greater levels of 
underpricing. Not surprisingly, investors who have indicated their positive expectations 
of the firms’ growth prospects and demonstrated willingness to purchase the IPOs at 
higher prices must be rewarded via some forms of deliberate underpricing.  
 
 Adding on to the above, other theories hinging on the asymmetric information 
assumption have also been put forth to explain the underpricing phenomenon. The 
signaling model (Allen and Faulhaber, 1989; Welch, 1989; Chemmanur, 1993) and the 
investment bank monopsony power theory (Baron, 1982; Habib and Ljungqvist, 2001) 
are just two examples documented in the literature. On closer inspection, the asymmetric 
information based theories appear to share the common belief that underpricing is a 
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‘positive phenomenon’ as it encourages greater market participation, and in turn enhances 
greater market efficiency in an information-asymmetrical IPO market.  
 
2.3.2.2 SYMMETRY INFORMATION BASED THEORIES 
Much of the explanations for underpricing have evolved around the notion of 
asymmetric information. Explanations that do not rely on this assumption include the 
lawsuit avoidance hypothesis which proposes that issuers intentionally undervalue their 
IPOs so as to reduce their exposure to future lawsuits and legal liability (Hughes and 
Thakar, 1992; Tinic, 1988). Corporate control considerations might have also contributed 
to the underpricing phenomenon. Boehmer and Fishe (2001) suggest that underpricing 
leads to greater market liquidity and larger ownership dispersion, indirectly making it 
more difficult for ‘outside’ investors to challenge the management team (Brennan and 
Franks, 1997; Boot and Chua, 1996). 
 
In addition, studies in the field of behavioral finance have shown that market 
psychology do play an important role in the underpricing of IPOs. The impresario 
hypothesis (Shiller, 1988) postulates that underwriters deliberately price new issues 
below the market-clearing price so as to generate greater publicity and promote investor 
enthusiasm among clienteles. Congruent to this perspective, Shiller and Pound (1989) 
posit that investors are not perfectly rational, hence any increase in investor enthusiasm 
between the offer date and the aftermarket would inevitably result in short-term 
underpricing.  
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Despite the numerous explanations put forth to explain the underpricing 
phenomenon, Ritter and Welch (2002) show that none of the theoretical reasons holds the 
key to the underpricing puzzle. In the concluding statement, Ritter and Welch (2002) 
argue that ‘it is not so much of which model is right, but more a matter of the relative 
importance of different models’ that actually determines the degree of underpricing in 
each unique IPO.  
 
2.4  LONG-RUN UNDERPERFORMANCE PHENOMENON  
2.4.1  OVERVIEW OF PAST LITERATURE 
 The returns performance of IPOs in the post-issue market has attracted 
considerable attention in academia. Although the remarkable price appreciation witness 
on the first day of trading is ‘gratifying’ to investors (McCarthy, 1999), the long-run 
performance of IPOs, unfortunately, ‘did not fare so well’ (Stoll and Curley, 1970).  
 
 Preliminary evidence of the ‘lackluster’ aftermarket performance of IPOs is 
documented by Ibbotson (1975), Stern and Bornstein (1985) and Buser and Chan (1987). 
Using a sample of 1,526 U.S. IPOs with listing dates between 1975 and 1985, Ritter 
(1991) demonstrates that IPO firms generally underperform their industry peers by 
approximately twenty-seven percent over a three year holding horizon. Correspondingly, 
a strategy of investing in IPOs at the end of the first trading day and holding them over 
three years would have left the investor with significantly less wealth than if he had 
invested in a portfolio of seasoned firms already listed on the stock exchange. In the long 
run, IPOs appear to be overpriced. 
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2.4.2  POSSIBLE EXPLANATIONS 
 There are two main strands of explanations for the long-run underperformance of 
IPOs. The first strand of reasoning is the ‘divergence of opinion hypothesis’ (Miller, 
1977). Based on the assumption that investors hold divergent views about the growth 
prospects of firms, Miller (1977) argues that the immediate post-issue stock price 
performance of IPO firms reflect the market valuations of the most optimistic investors. 
Over time, as investors obtain more information about the firms, the variances in 
opinions between the highly optimistic investors and the general investing public narrow 
and converge towards the mean. This results in a general price decline of the IPO firms 
over the longer horizon.  
 
 The second strand of reasoning is the ‘hot issue’ market hypothesis (Ritter, 1998).   
Defining the ‘hot issue’ market as a period marked with extraordinary high IPO volumes 
and high initial returns, Aggarwal and Rivoli (1990) and Loughran, et al., (1994) find that 
IPOs listed during the ‘hot issue’ markets report extremely negative market-adjusted long 
run returns and perform significantly poorer than the rest of the IPOs (Ritter, 1998). 
Loughran (1993) infers that this is due to IPO firms being able to time their listings 
during market peaks and take advantage of the windows of opportunity to push for higher 
valuations. However, the attractive return performances in the first few days of trading 
are not sustainable. Over the longer-horizon, IPO firms underperform the market and 
their industry peers. This systematic evidence of negative long-run abnormal returns has 
nevertheless been shown to be consistent with the efficient market hypothesis (Shaw, 
1971; Ibbotson, 1975). 
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2.5  INVESTMENT BANKS  
2.5.1  INTERMEDIARY FUNCTION 
Numerous studies have documented the importance of investment banks in the 
IPO process. By providing a suite of financial services to IPO firms, investment banks 
endeavor to bridge firms in search of capital with investors seeking investment 
opportunities (Fang, 2005). 
 
As discussed in Section 2.3.2.1, the IPO market is characterized by pronounced 
information asymmetries. Given the unique role of investment banks in the financial 
markets and their ability to gain access to proprietary information, investment banks are 
therefore in an excellent position to certify and reassure investors that the offer price is 
truly consistent with inside information (Booth and Smith, 1986; Ross, et al., 2002). 
 
However, determining the correct offer price is never straightforward (Ross, et al., 
2002). An offer price that is set too high or too low imposes huge costs to the IPO firm 
either in terms of an unsuccessful IPO (if the issue is priced too high) or opportunity costs 
to pre-issue shareholders (if the issue is priced too low). As McCarthy (1999) aptly 
describes, the ‘IPO valuation is as much an art as a science’. While the presumed 
intention of investment bank is to obtain the best price for the IPO firm, the 
overwhelming literature of positive first-day return garner less convincing evidence that 
underwriters are able to accomplish this task consistently.  
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Loughran and Ritter (2002) reason that investment banks are faced with a number 
of conflicting goals. On the demand side, investors want to pay the lowest price for the 
IPO stocks while on the supply side, issuers want to get the highest price for their IPOs. 
In an effort to strike a balance, investment banks have traditionally applied a discount of 
ten to twenty percent to the IPO’s estimated value (McCarthy, 1999). More recently, 
empirical studies indicate that investment banks are leaving more money on the table 
than necessary and have allegedly been reported to allocate a disproportionate fraction of 
the underpriced issue to favored clienteles (Pulliam and Smith, 2000; Pulliam and Smith 
2001). This suggests that investment banks, driven by private motives, might not always 
be acting in the best interests of the issuer and the investors at large. Hence, the choice of 
the underwriter is of extreme importance in ensuring that the issuer obtains maximum 
proceeds from the IPO.  
 
2.5.2 INVESTMENT BANK REPUTATION 
In the investment banking industry where reputation is a highly valued and much 
guarded asset, any acts of dishonesty could have serious repercussions to the reputation 
of the investment banks. Unless the short-term profits from dishonesty far outweighs the 
present value of future income, investment banks will find it sub-optimal to derail from 
the best interests of the issuers and public investors (Fang, 2005). In particular, 
established investment banks commanding large market shares are exceptionally 
vulnerable to missteps and thus have less incentives to act opportunistically, given the 
substantial ‘reputation capital’ at stake (DeLong, 1991; Dunbar, 2000). To preserve their 
reputation capital, high reputation investment banks adopt a more stringent set of 
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evaluation standards when selecting underwriting assignments. In light of this, good 
quality firms could signal to potential investors their low risk profile by hiring investment 
banks that rank high in prestige (Fang, 2005).  
 
Intuitively, the more reputable the investment bank, the higher is the quality of the 
underwriting service. Chemmanur and Fulghieri (1994) and Booth and Smith (1986) 
propose that IPOs underwritten by high reputation underwriters face lower risk of short-
term underpricing and are more likely to generate better returns over the longer-term 
horizon. To test this intuition, researchers have devised a number of proxies to measure 
the underwriter reputation (see, among others, Logue, 1973; Beatty and Ritter, 1986; 
Johnson and Miller, 1988; Carter and Manaster, 1990; Megginson and Weiss, 1991). 
Carter and Manaster’s (1990) ‘tombstone’ announcement-based ranking and Megginson 
and Weiss’s (1991) relative market share-based ranking are among the more popular ones 
used in empirical research.  
 
Notably, prior IPO studies on the reputational influence of underwriters have 
drawn mixed conclusions. For instance, while earlier studies find that IPOs underwritten 
by high reputation investment banks are associated with smaller extent of underpricing 
(Fisher and McDonald, 1972; Logue, 1973; Carter, et al., 1998), recent data looking at 
the second half of 1990s have noted that this relationship has undergone significant 
structural shift over time (Beatty and Welch, 1996; Cooney, et al., 2000). The later 
findings contradict the widely known ‘certification hypothesis’ and implies that IPOs 
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underwritten by high reputation underwriters are instead characterized by greater 
mispricing.  
 
Similarly, studies analyzing the relation between underwriter reputation and long-
run returns performance have not been able to obtain consistent evidence either. 
Although some studies have shown that underwriter reputation is positively correlated 
with long-run stock returns performance (Michaely and Shaw, 1994; Carter, et al., 1998), 
other studies have however noted no significant relation between the two parameters 
(Logue, et al., 2002; Chemmanur and Krishnan, 2007). In view of the inconclusive 
evidence on the relation between underwriter reputation and IPO returns, the reputational 
impact of underwriters thus presents an interesting area for in-depth research.   
 
 
2.6 OVERVIEW OF PAST SINGAPORE-BASED IPO STUDIES  
 
Notwithstanding the relatively small size of the Singapore market, there have 
been a number of studies done on the new issues in the country. As early as 1980s, 
Dawson (1984), Koh and Tee (1985) and Wong and Chiang (1986) have documented 
evidence of prevalent short-run underpricing in the domestic market. By examining IPOs 
that were listed between 1970s and 1980s, the researchers find that the average initial 
return ranges from 27 percent (Koh and Walter, 1989) to 56 percent (Wong and Chiang, 
1986). Notably, the degree of underpricing appears to have weakened considerably over 
the years as the Singapore economy matures. A recent study by Reber and Fong (2006) 
points to an initial return of approximately 18 percent using data between 1998 and 2000. 
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This is consistent with the conjecture of Saunders and Lim (1990), which hypothesizes 
underpricing to decrease with time as issuers and investors learn from past experiences.  
 
In fact, the distinctive institutional arrangements governing the new issues in 
Singapore has opened new opportunities for researchers to perform studies that are not 
achievable using data sets from other countries. In particular, Koh and Walter (1989) 
have harnessed the unique data availability to prove the empirical relevance of Rock’s 
(1986) winner’s curse hypothesis. Taking this line of research further, Reber and Fong 
(2006) subsequently demonstrate the winner’s curse adverse selection problem to be the 
most significant contributor to the underpricing phenomenon among the various 
asymmetry information based theories put forth on underpricing (see Section 2.3.2.1). 
 
Given the unique institutional arrangements of the Singapore IPO market, coupled 
with the distinctive data availability on subscription levels, rationing mechanism and 
listing information, the domestic market holds a wealth of knowledge that awaits further 
exploration. A detailed discussion on the country’s listing procedures and institutional 
framework is presented in Section 3.1.3 and 3.1.4 respectively.  
 
2.7 CONCLUDING REMARKS 
This chapter provides an overview of past research that has been done on initial 
public offering. Emphasis is placed on two widely documented market anomalies namely 
the short-run underpricing puzzle and long-run underperformance phenomenon. In 
addition, we also furnish a brief account of the prior works on investment banks and their 
role in the IPO process. Concluding the chapter, we provide a summary of the more 
prominent works done on the Singapore IPO market thus far. 
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3.1 RESEARCH SETTING 
 As our study focuses on the Singapore market, we will delicate this chapter to 
provide an overview of the macroeconomic environment in Singapore. First, in Section 
3.1.1, we examine the key developments in the financial market. This is followed by a 
brief introduction of the Singapore stock exchange in Section 3.1.2. In Sections 3.1.3 and 
3.1.4, we outline the IPO process and discuss the unique institutional arrangements 
prevailing in the domestic IPO market. 
 
3.1.1 SINGAPORE ECONOMY AND FINANCIAL SECTOR 
 The Singapore economy enjoyed a period of prosperity from 1987 to 1996 as the 
nation witnessed a decade of strong and sustained GDP (Gross Domestic Product) growth 
since the beginning of 19874. Economists attributed the rapid growth to fundamentally 
sound macroeconomic management and well-engineered development policies. This, 
coupled with the escalating growth in neighboring East Asian economies, fuelled the rise 
of Singapore as one of the “four tigers” in Asia5. 
                                                 
4
 The growth rate of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) was relatively high during the period 1987 to 1996 
and remained constantly above the six percent mark. In four of the ten years, double-digit economic growth 
was recorded (1988, 1989, 1993 and 1994). Per capita GDP also increased steadily from S$15,613 in 1987 
to S$35,552 in 1996. Inflation was, however, kept in check at below 3.5 percent per annum.  
For more details of the various economic indicators, please refer to the official website of the Singapore 
Department of Statistics at http://www.singstat.gov.sg. 
 
5
 A term coined by economists to connote a country of rapid economic growth. The other three countries 
that were conferred the title of Asian ‘tigers’ were Hong Kong, Taiwan and South Korea. Please refer to the 
research report by Page (1994) entitled ‘The East Asian Miracle: An Introduction” dated in 1994. 
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 The good days of economic prosperity came to an abrupt halt in 1997 as East 
Asian economies were hit by one of the worst financial crisis. Within a year, the stock 
markets around the region such as Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines South Korea and 
Thailand lost more than sixty percent of their value (The Economist dated March 7, 
1998). Inevitably, Singapore’s small and open economy felt quite acutely the tremors of 
the financial crisis. Its stock market experienced a sharp sell-off, plunging more than 
forty percent amid plummeting investor confidence and rising worries of a recession. In 
1998, the country recorded its first negative growth in a decade.   
 
 In spite of the economic downswing, Singapore was less adversely affected vis-à-
vis its regional neighbours. The economic crisis, however, triggered serious scrutiny at 
the structure of the country’s financial sector, precipitating reforms that were to be rolled 
out in the upcoming five years.   
 
 The first wave of reforms came in 1998 when the government announced its plans 
to progressively open up the financial sector and allow market forces greater free play. 
The banking sector, insurance companies, stockbrokerages and fund management 
industry were the focus of this liberalization initiative6. The move introduced steeper 
                                                 
6
 In a speech given by Prime Minister, Lee Hsien Loong (Chairman, Monetary Authority of Singapore) at 
the MAS Work Plan Seminar on 3 April 2000, the Prime Minister provided an account of the milestones 
achieved under the financial liberalization programme. A summary of the reforms is outlined below: 
i) Banking: Qualifying Full Bank licenses were introduced to offshore banks, with the aim of promoting 
greater competition in the banking sector. Also, limits on the foreign shareholdings were removed to 
give local banks greater autonomy and operational flexibility. 
ii) Stock market: SGX became Asia-Pacific’s first demutualised and integrated securities and derivatives 
exchange. Listing requirements were revised to give more flexibility to growth enterprises and foreign 
companies. (Please refer to the next page for continuation of this footnote.) 
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competition to the financial industry, forcing operators to concentrate on their core 
competencies and increase efficiency. Liberalization also prompted a spate of high profile 
domestic and regional mergers and acquisitions (M&A) deals, including the much-
publicized consolidation of the six local banks into just three7. The gradual liberalization 
of the financial sector helped to strengthen the fundamentals of the financial sector and in 
turn fostered Singapore’s position as a global financial hub. 
 
3.1.2 CHARACTERISTICS OF SINGAPORE EXCHANGE  
The Stock Exchange of Singapore (SES) was inaugurated in 1973. Emanated 
from the termination of the currency interchangeability system between Singapore and 
Malaysia, the stock exchange underwent a number of major revamps over the years. For 
instance, in December 1999, SES merged with Singapore International Monetary 
Exchange (SIMEX) to form the Singapore Exchange (SGX).  
 
To date, the SGX operates two main markets for the trading of stocks. They are 
the Main Board and the Stock Exchange of Singapore Dealing and Automated Quotation 
(SESDAQ) respectively. Apart from the fact that the Main Board hosts the more 
established and higher market capitalization companies, the listing requirements of the 
                                                                                                                                                 
iii) Debt market: Restrictions on borrowing Singdollar (S$) were relaxed to enable foreign players to issue 
S$ bonds. More Singapore Government Securities were issued and maturity profile was extended to 
add depth and liquidity to the bond market. 
iv) Fund management: More funds (for example, Central Provident Funds) were made accessible for fund 
management. New tax incentives were introduced to attract fund managers to the local scene.  
v) Insurance: Insurance brokers who met the requirements were allowed to enter the insurance market. 
Limits on the foreign shareholdings in local insurance companies were abolished. 
 
7
 The three M&A deals were:  
i) Acquisition of Post Office Savings Bank (POSB) by The Development Bank of Singapore (DBS) in 
1998; 
ii) Acquisition of Overseas Union Bank (OUB) by United Overseas Bank (UOB) in 2001; 
iii) Acquisition of Keppel TatLee Bank by Oversea-Chinese Banking Corporation (OCBC) in 2001. 
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Main Board are also more stringent than that of SESDAQ. Table 3.1 outlines the salient 
differences in listing requirements for both the Main Board as well as SESDAQ. 
 
 With reference to Table 3.1, a firm needs to satisfy a more restrictive set of 
criteria in order to be listed on the Main Board. Particularly, a firm has to demonstrate a 
history of profitable operations by meeting one of the following criteria: 
a) Cumulative consolidated pre-tax profit of at least S$7.5 million for the 
preceding three years and a minimum pre-tax profit of S$1 million for each of 
those three years, or 
b) Cumulative consolidated pre-tax profit of at least S$10 million for the 
preceding one or two years, or 
c) Market capitalization of at least S$80 million calculated based on the issue 
price and post-invitation issued share capital. 
 
In comparison, SESDAQ does not dictate any of the above profitability 
requirements. Less stringent requirements on SESDAQ allow small and medium-sized 
enterprises to raise capital more easily for their operations and investments. However, 
should the SESDAQ-listed company wish to be listed on the Main Board after two years 
of listing on SESDAQ, it would have to comply with the same listing requirements as 
that of the other Main Board-listed companies.  
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TABLE 3.1: Listing Requirements of Singapore Exchange (SGX) 
 
The table shows the listing requirements for the two markets of the Singapore Exchange (SGX) that is, the 
Main Board and the Stock Exchange of Singapore Dealing and Automated Quotation (SESDAQ). 
Specifically, a company may list on the Main Board if it meets any of the three criteria (Criteria 1, 2 and 3) 
below. The purpose of having three criteria is to cater to a wide spectrum of companies with different 
business models. The table is adapted from SGX website at http://www.mas.gov.sg. 
 
  Main Board   SESDAQ 
  Criteria 1   Criteria 2   Criteria 3     
Pre-tax Profits Cumulative pre-tax 
profit of at least 
S$7.5 million over 
the last 3 
consecutive years, 
with a pre-tax profit 
of at least S$1 
million in each of 
those 3 years 
 Cumulative pre-tax 
profit of at least 
S$10 million for the 
last 1 or 2 years 
 Not applicable  Nil. Business is 







Not applicable  Not applicable  Market 
capitalization of at 
least S$80 million at 
the time of the initial 
public offering, 





 Not applicable 
Shareholding 
Spread 
25% of issued shares in the hands of at least 1,000 shareholders. 
(For market capitalization > S$300 million, shareholding spread 
will vary between 12-20%) 
 At least 500,000 
shares or 15% of 
issued shares 
(whichever is 
greater) in the 





3 years  Not applicable  Not applicable  A company with 
no track record 
has to 
demonstrate that 
it requires funds 










3 years  1 or 2 years as the 
case may be 
 Not applicable  Not applicable 
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3.1.3 THE NEW ISSUE PROCSS IN SINGAPORE 
 The IPO is seen as an important milestone in a company’s history. The entire 
listing process takes on average twelve to sixteen weeks, with preparatory works 
commencing very much earlier. The process begins with the company submitting its 
listing application and prospectus, accompanied by other necessary documentations, to 
SGX for review8.  
 
Besides the stringent quantitative requirements specified in Table 3.1, the 
Singapore Exchange also assesses the qualitative factors of the company such as its 
growth potential and integrity of the management when evaluating the company’s 
application for listing. Upon meeting the listing requirements to the satisfaction of SGX, 
the company is conferred the eligibility to list. The company is then able to lodge its 
preliminary prospectus with the Monetary Authority of Singapore (MAS). MAS 
subsequently publish the company’s preliminary prospectus on the Internet for public 
comments.  
 
After the completion of the mandatory review by the two regulatory bodies (SGX 
and MAS), the company proceeds to file the final prospectus with MAS. Notably, the 
prospectus is an important document in an IPO. Apart from providing insights of the 
company’s fundamentals through the historical accounting information, the prospectus 
encompasses a wealth of other useful details such as the objective of the issue, the issue 
price, the method of allotting the shares as well as the one-year-ahead profit forecasts 
                                                 
8
 Prior to this, the company could arrange for a consultation session with SGX to resolve specific issues. 
This would speed up the listing process and reduce possible additional costs arising from any delays.  
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made by the management. The filing of the final prospectus signifies the end of the 
prospectus registration stage and the company is ready for the launch of its IPO.  
 
The IPO is officially launched when the company’s prospectus is disseminated to 
the public. Interested investors are invited to subscribe for the shares within the offer 
period. The payment for the IPO can be made via the cashier’s order or through an 
electronic share application. Upon the closing of the offer, the IPO shares are allotted 
pursuant to the basis spelt out in the prospectus. The outcome of the issue, together with 
the level of the subscription rate, is publicly announced and the details are made known 
to the public through the media for investors’ information. With all required 
documentations properly filed with the regulatory bodies, the issuer is admitted to the 
Official List of SGX. Trading finally commences on a date that is determined by the 
Exchange either on a deferred settlement basis or a ready basis. Figure 3.1 provides a 
simple illustration of the entire IPO process.  
 
To ensure that the IPO goes smoothly, the company typically engages a 
Singapore-based financial institution, usually a member company of SGX, to be its 
sponsor and lead manager. Unlike in the United States where issuers were constrained by 
the Glass-Steagall9 Act in their choice of the underwriter, the company seeking a listing 
in Singapore is free to choose the issue manager and/or underwriter under the Securities 
Industry Act (Saunders and Lim, 1990; Tan et al., 1999). The role of the issue manager is 
                                                 
9
 The Glass-Steagall Act essentially separates commercial banking from investment banking. Under this 
provision, commercial banks are prohibited from simultaneously accepting deposits and underwriting 
securities. The Act was repealed in 1999 with the passing of the Financial Modernization Act.  
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to assist the firm in the managing of the entire IPO process. From conducting due 
diligence assessment on the company, drafting its prospectus to the final submission of 
the listing application on behalf of the issuer, the issue manager works very closely with 
the issuer to ensure that the IPO would be a successful one. The responsibilities of the 
issue manager are detailed in Section 3.3.4.  
 
 
FIGURE 3.1: Indicative Timeline for the Listing Process 
 
The figure below illustrates the timeline for the listing process. The figure is adapted from SGX website at 
http://www.mas.gov.sg. 
 
 Approximately 12 - 16 weeks   
 
 
   
Day 0 8 - 12 weeks  2 - 4 weeks     
     
Pre-Submission 
Consultation  




         
Consult SGX on 




prospectus to SGX 
Lodge preliminary 
prospectus with 
MAS for public 
comments  
Register and lodge 
final prospectus with 
MAS 
Offer closes  
 SGX reviews listing 




indicates the IPO’s 
eligibility to list. 
MAS reviews 
prospectus  
Launch of offer Issuers' securities are 
listed and trading 
commences 
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3.1.4 INSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS  
 A unique feature of the domestic IPO market lies in the share rationing process 
when over-subscription occurs. As documented by Koh and Walter (1989), IPO over-
subscription is extremely pervasive in the Singapore IPO market. During the period 
spanning from 1998 to 2000, an average issue in Singapore is oversubscribed by 
approximately fifty-six times (Reber and Fong, 2006). In view of the over-subscription 
phenomenon, Rule 233(1) of the SGX Listing Manual emphasizes the need for a fair and 
equitable allotment of shares to the investor community.  
 
To ensure an unbiased and even-handed share allocation process, the applicants to 
a typical Singapore IPO are usually grouped into categories depending on the number of 
shares they subscribe. Applicants within the same size-of-application category enjoy the 
same probability of receiving an allocation and consequently each applicant receives a 
fair game. In contrast, investors in other countries could be denied entry to a specific IPO 
simply due to biasness of the issue managers or underwriters, who are often given the full 
discretion over the allocation of the IPO shares (Lee, et al., 1996).  
 
 While the applicants for the same number of shares are treated equally, Saunders 
and Lim (1990) however observe a tendency for issuers to skew the allocation of shares 
towards the group of smaller investors. The general bias towards smaller investors is 
partly prompted by the listing criteria laid down by SGX which specified upfront the 
shareholding distribution requirements imposed on each IPO in accordance to the size of 
their offer. Specifically, Rule 234 of the SGX Listing Manual states that a proportion of 
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the IPO should, at a minimum, be distributed to a pool of investors. The details of the 
listing requirements on shareholding distribution are outlined in Table 3.2 below. 
 
 
TABLE 3.2: Listing Requirements on Shareholding Distribution 
 
The table shows the distribution requirements for the respective offer sizes. This set of requirements is 
applicable to both the Main Board-listed companies as well as the SESDAQ-listed companies. The 
shareholdings of the applicant and its associates must be aggregated and is treated as one single holder. It is 
also important to note that preferential allotments made pursuant to Rule 234 of the SGX Listing Manual is 
to be excluded from this requirement. Rule 234 states that the issuer may reserve up to 10% of the offered 
securities (or 25%, in the case of SESDAQ issuer) for allocation and allotment to its employees, directors, 
customers, suppliers and persons who have contributed to the success of the firm. The table is adapted from 
SGX website at http://www.mas.gov.sg. 
 
Total Offer Size 
 (S$ million) 
Distribution 
("O")   
O < 75 At least 40% of the invitation shares or S$15 million whichever is lower, must be 
distributed to investors, each allotted not more than 0.8% of the invitation shares or 
S$300,000 worth of shares whichever is lower. 
 
75  ≤  O < 120 At least 20% of the invitation shares must be distributed to investors, each allotted 
not more than 0.4% of the invitation shares. 
 
O ≥  120 No requirement applicable. 
 




 In addition to the unique share rationing process, there also exist other systematic 
differences between the domestic IPO market and other international markets in terms of 
the listing requirements and contractual mechanisms used in the flotation process (Lee, et 
al., 1996). Researchers (McStay, 1987; Koh and Walter, 1989; Reber and Fong, 2006) 
postulate that the unique institutional framework of the local IPO market could have 
significant implications on the short-run underpricing puzzle and long-run 
underperformance phenomenon observed in Singapore, possibly leading to variations in 
Chapter 3: Research Design 
Page 32    
the extent of the anomalies between the local market and other IPO markets. This drives 
the motivation behind our study. 
 
3.2 DATA SOURCES AND SAMPLE SELECTION 
 Our study examines the IPOs listed on the Singapore Exchange (“Exchange”) 
over the period spanning from January 1, 1997 to August 22, 2008. The sample period is 
determined by the availability of the data and is unique as it compasses the Asian 
financial crisis in 1997 and 1998, the burst of the tech bubble in 2001, the September 11 
terrorists’ attacks on the U.S., the Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) epidemic 
incident in 2003 and the recent U.S. sub-prime crisis in 2008. The chain of events offers 
an exciting proposition to probe into the IPO short-run underpricing puzzle and long-run 
underperformance phenomenon against the backdrop of periodic economic downswings.  
 
 The data required for the study comes primarily from IPO prospectuses and 
Datastream financial database. Specifics of each offering including the number of shares 
issued, the number of shares offered by existing shareholders, the offer price, the issue 
manager involved, the closing date of subscription, the listing date, the company’s 
incorporation date as well as other historical accounting data are hand-collected from 
each individual IPO prospectus filed with the Exchange. These prospectuses are publicly 
available and can be easily downloadable from SGX official website. In addition, 
supplementary data such as the daily stock prices of the IPO firms in the post-issue 
period, the returns performance of the market index and the accounting information of the 
size-and-industry matched firms are obtained from the Datastream financial database.  
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The sample consists of IPOs that have been listed on the Main Board and 
SESDAQ from January 1, 1997 to 22 August, 2008. These IPOs must meet the following 
selection criteria: 
• The IPO has a complete set of listing information required for the analysis such as 
the offer price and offer size which is used to determine the reputation ranking of 
the issue manager. 
• The IPO has a single issue manager assisting in the IPO process. All IPOs with 
either no issue manager or more than one issue manager are excluded from the 
study.  
•  The IPO relates to the listing of a corporate stock. As is common in previous IPO 
studies, real estate investment trust (REIT) issues and global depository receipts 
(GDR) are excluded to ensure results comparability and data consistency with 
prior literature (Loughran and Ritter, 1995; Teoh, et al., 1998; Kim and Ritter, 
1999; Chemmanur and Krishnan, 2007).  
• Lastly, the IPO must have at least one day of stock price data to allow us to 
estimate the initial return variable in the study. This is important as it indicates 
that the IPO is successfully listed on the stock exchange. 
 
Our final sample stands at 384 IPOs over the eleven years eight months period 
with the most number of observations in 2004 (sixty IPOs) and the least in 1997 and 1998 
(eight IPOs each). The aggregated gross proceeds from IPOs cumulate to more than 
S$10.7 billion. The year 1999 also saw gross proceeds almost reaching S$1.8 billion, the 
highest amount of gross proceeds registered in a single year. To ensure the reliability and 
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accuracy of the data analysis, great care is exercised at every stage of the data collection 
process.  
 
3.3 VARIABLES DEFINITION 
3.3.1 PRICE-TO-EARNINGS (PE) RATIO 
 The PE ratio is one of the accounting multiples that have been widely used to 
determine the underlying value of the IPO.  In fact, practitioners and researchers often 
attempt to infer the valuation of an IPO by comparing the ratio against that of similar 
firms in the market (Boatsman and Baskin, 1981; Alford, 1992; Kim and Ritter, 1999). 
Undoubtedly, the PE ratio is one of the important variables that the Exchange pays a 
great deal of attention to when evaluating the listing application (Lee, et al., 1996).  
 
The study examines the PE ratio of the IPO firms. Information on the PE ratio is 
extracted from the prospectus, under the section on “invitation statistics”. The PE ratio is 
measured by taking the offer price divided by the net earnings-per-share (EPS) of the 
firm (where net EPS is the net earnings obtained from the latest audited financial 
statements and based on the number of shares held prior to the IPO). In mathematical 






   PE =        (1.1) 
where, 
Offer Pricei   =    Offer price of the issuing firm i, and  
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Net EPSi  =    Net Earnings-Per-Share of  the issuing firm i, taken as: 
Net earnings based on the latest audited financial statements  
Divided by the number of shares held prior to the IPO  
  
 Similar to Kim and Ritter (1999), we shall benchmark the PE ratio of the IPO firm 
against the PE ratio of a non-issuing size-and-industry matched firm (MF) for comparison 
purposes. The PE ratio of the size-and-industry matched firm is obtained from the 
Datastream financial database and is defined as the ending market price of the matched 
firm as at the IPO firm’s closing subscription date divided by the net EPS reported in the 
matched firm’s latest audited financial statements. Simply, the formula used to calculate 






   PE =        (1.2) 
where, 
Market PriceMF  =   Ending market price of the size-and-industry matched firm MF as at 
the IPO firm’s closing subscription date, and  
Net EPSMF =   Net Earnings-Per-Share of the size-and-industry matched firm MF 
based on the latest audited financial statements 
 
The portfolio of size-and-industry matched firms represents the non-issuing 
publicly traded companies that are already listed on SGX. As discussed, the portfolio of 
size-and-industry matched firms is important as it provides the basis for evaluation. 
These companies are selected based on a set of matching criteria. The details of the 
matching procedures are outlined in Section 4.1. 
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3.3.2  INITIAL RETURN (IR) 
 Decades of research have shown that IPOs are underpriced. To reflect the extent 
of mispricing, the initial stock return (or first-day return) measure is commonly used as a 
proxy for mispricing in the IPO literature. This study analyzes three different measures of 
initial return namely raw initial return, market-adjusted initial return and matched firm-
adjusted initial return. They are defined as follows.  
 
 Raw initial return (Ri,0) is measured as the difference between the first day closing 











=         (2.1) 
where, 
Pi,t  =   Closing market price of the issuing firm i on day t, where t=1  and  
Pi,0 =   Offer price of  the issuing firm i  
 
Market-adjusted initial return (MARi,0) is measured as the raw initial return of the 
IPO firm less the contemporaneous return of the Straits Times Index (STI) 10 . 
Mathematically, it is denoted as follows:  
 
0,0,0, mii RRMAR −=         (2.2) 
 
                                                 
10
 The Straits Times Index (STI) is a value-weighted index based on a representative portfolio of companies 
listed on the Singapore Exchange (SGX). It is the stock market index frequently used in Singapore. 
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where, 
Ri,0  =   Raw initial return of the issuing firm i as derived in Equation 2.1,  
and  
Rm,0 =   Return on STI as at IPO listing date 
 
 Matched firm-adjusted initial return (MFARi,0) is measured as raw initial return of 
the IPO firm less the contemporaneous return of the non-issuing size-and-industry 
matched firm. Mathematically, it is denoted as follows: 
 
0,0,0, MFii RRMFAR −=        (2.3) 
where, 
Ri,0  =   Raw initial return of the issuing firm i as derived in Equation 2.1,  
and  
RMF,0 =  Return of the non-issuing size-and–industry matched firm MF as at 
IPO listing date 
 
As described above, the market-adjusted initial return and matched firm-adjusted 
initial return have explicitly been adjusted for movements in the market index and the 
corresponding stock price performances of the non-issuing size-and-industry matched 
firms respectively. This is to control for changes in market conditions, industry effects as 
well as possible size bias that could potentially affect the robustness of our results 
(Ibbotson and Jaffe, 1975; Loughran and Ritter, 1995).  
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In summary, mispricing occurs when any of the three measures (Ri,0 , MARi,0 or 
MFARi,0) computed from Equations 2.1, 2.2 and 2.3 returns a value that is not equals to 
zero. Specifically, if either Ri,0 , MARi,0 or MFARi,0 is positive, the IPO is said to be 
underpriced. Conversely, if Ri,0 , MARi,0  or MFARi,0 is negative, then the IPO is said to be 
overpriced.  
 
3.3.3 LONG-RUN RETURNS (LR) 
 Numerous studies have demonstrated that IPOs underperform in the long run. To 
examine the aftermarket stock performance of IPOs, the study tracks the daily share price 
movements of each IPO firm up till its second anniversary starting from its first day of 
trading. Due to data availability constraints, we are only able to obtain the daily stock 
returns data till 22 August 2008. Hence, the long-run returns computation can only be 
cumulated up till 22 August 2008. 
 
The choice of a two-year holding horizon appears to be the most appropriate for 
the study after weighing the trade-off between greater accuracy (a longer returns horizon 
might provide more insights on the extent of the long-run underperformance) and better 
sample representation (a shorter return horizon, on the other hand, would lead to a larger 
sample size and a better representation of the population). Further, previous studies have 
shown that a two-year horizon is adequate when analyzing the aftermarket performances 
of IPO firms (Agarwal, et al., 2003).  
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 In this study, a year is defined as the summation of twelve months with each 
month comprising of twenty-one trading days (Ritter, 1991; Loughran and Ritter, 1995). 
Like prior studies, we exclude the initial return of the IPO from the long-run returns 
computations. This is because it is often difficult for an investor to obtain the shares of an 
IPO at the offer price, in view of the prevalent over-subscription phenomenon seen in 
most IPOs (Loughran and Ritter, 1995). Thus, when computing the long-run returns of 
IPOs, researchers typically define the first-month return as the cumulation of daily 
compounded returns starting from the second trading day (event day 2) to the twenty-
second trading day (event day 22) and henceforth. In aggregate, a twenty-four months 
buy-and-hold returns11 would thus consist of daily compounded returns spanning over 
504 trading days (12 months multiplied by 21 trading days per month) extending from 
listing date + 1 through listing date + 504.  
 
Varying time horizons for the long-run returns cumulation (three, six, twelve and 
twenty-four months) are examined in this study. To maximize the number of IPOs for 
each test, we adopt an approach whereby an IPO would be included in the analysis as 
long as it has sufficient data for the designated test. To illustrate, a firm that is listed on 
January 1, 2008 might not have sufficient share price data for the twelve-month returns 
analysis but would instead have sufficient share price data for the six-month and three-
month returns analyses. Hence, the IPO would be included in the later tests only.   
 
                                                 
11
 Loughran and Ritter (1995) argue that the buy-and-hold strategy avoids the problems caused by frequent 
transactions that could arise from a rebalancing approach.  
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Like in the initial return analysis, the long-run returns analysis looks at three 
different measures for the returns computation namely the raw buy-and-hold returns, the 
market-adjusted buy-and-hold returns and the matched firm-adjusted buy-and-hold 
returns. They are defined as follows.  
 
 Raw buy-and-hold returns (BHRi,T) is measured as the cumulation of the daily 
compounded returns from a buy-and-hold strategy where the IPO stock is purchased at a 
price equivalent to the market price at the end of the first trading day. Mathematically, it 















1)1(        (3.1) 
where, 
Ri,t  =   Raw return of the issuing firm i at event day t 
T =   Holding period ranging from 3 to 24 months, where Max T = Listing  
date + 504 trading days 
 
Market-adjusted buy-and-hold returns (MABHRi,T) is measured as the raw buy-
and-hold returns of the IPO firm less the contemporaneous compounded returns of the 
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where, 
Ri,t  =   Raw return of the issuing firm i at event day t 
Rm,t =   Return on STI at event day t 
T =   Holding period ranging from 3 to 24 months, where Max T = Listing 
date + 504 trading days 
 
 Matched firm-adjusted buy-and-hold returns (MFABHRi,T) is measured as the raw 
buy-and-hold returns of the IPO firm less the contemporaneous compounded returns of 




















)1()1(      (3.3) 
where, 
Ri,t  =   Raw return of the issuing firm i at event day t 
RMF,t =  Return of the non-issuing size-and–industry matched firm MF at event 
day t, and 
T =   Holding period ranging from 3 to 24 months, where Max T = Listing 
date + 504 trading days 
 
As noted in Equations 3.2 and 3.3, the same benchmarks have been used to adjust 
the returns measures for both the initial return and long-run returns analyses. This is to 
maintain consistency throughout the study. IPO long-run underperformance occurs when 
any of the three measures (BHRi,T , MABHRi,T  or MFABHRi,T) registers a negative value. 
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3.3.4  ISSUE MANAGER REPUTATION RANKING (REP) 
 In comparison to the underwriter, the issue manager reputation ranking and its 
impact on the IPO process has been relatively unexplored in academic research. Because 
of the vital role issue managers play in taking a firm public in Singapore, this study shall 
focus solely on the reputational role of issue managers in the domestic IPO process. 
Some of the responsibilities of the issue managers are listed below:   
(i) Conducting due diligence assessment on the company and providing 
professional advice to management; 
(ii) Preparing the company for listing by ensuring that the documentations 
necessary for compliance with listing rules has been promptly submitted to the 
Exchange and all admission requirements are properly met; 
(iii) Liaising with SGX on behalf of the company on all matters relating to the 
listing application; 
(iv) Ascertaining that all relevant information have been appropriately disclosed in 
the prospectus.  
 
In this study, we devise a three-tier issue manager reputation ranking (REP) based 
on some modifications of the Megginson and Weiss’ (1991) relative market share 
methodology. Simply adopting Megginson and Weiss’ (1991) relative market share 
approach in the study creates some problems in the calculating of the reputation measure. 
This is primarily due to the wave of mergers and acquisitions witnessed in the Singapore 
financial sector following the liberation initiative which was introduced in the middle of 
our sample period (see Section 3.1.1). To illustrate, many of the local banks and 
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investment institutions were urged by policy makers to merge with fellow peer 
institutions so as to reap economies of scale. As the reputation of the issue manager based 
on the Megginson and Weiss approach is determined by the gross proceeds of the issue 
manager over the entire sample period, issue managers which subsequently disappeared 
due to mergers and acquisitions would inevitably be allocated rankings that are biased 
downwards. Alternatively, combining the performance of several banks into one bank 
does not provide a well-rounded solution either as it distorts the true performance of the 
individual issue managers. To resolve the problem, we decide to adopt a ‘twelve-month 
rolling’ reputation ranking approach. This means that the reputation ranking of the issue 
manager will fluctuate depending on the extent of its IPO activities in each calendar year.   
 
To elaborate, we first compute the relative market share that is attributable to 








=       (4.1) 
where, 
Market Shareac  =   Market share attributed to issue manager a in calendar  year c 
Gross Proceedsac =   Summation of the gross proceeds of IPOs managed by issue manager 
a in calendar year c, and 




Price) Offering * shares ofNumber ( for all IPOs issued in 
calendar year c, and where A = All issue managers    
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 Having obtained the relative market share of the individual issue manager for 
each calendar year, we proceed to rank the issue managers into five quintile-portfolios 
based on the magnitude of their market share. Issue managers with the largest market 
share are placed in the most prestigious category (Portfolio 1) while those with the 
smallest market share are assigned to the least prestigious category (Portfolio 5). To 
facilitate analysis, issue managers in Portfolio 1 and 2 are further integrated to form the 
‘high reputation’ class denoted as REP 1 and issue managers in Portfolio 4 and 5 are 
combined to form the ‘low reputation’ class denoted as REP 3. The remaining issue 
managers in Portfolio 3 form the ‘average reputation’ class denoted as REP 2. 
Specifically, the issue manager reputation measure has been discretized into ordinal 
values for the purpose of this study. This is to facilitate easy comparison by the readers, 
thus allowing quick inferences to be drawn on the qualitative differences among the high, 
average and low reputation issue managers (Fang, 2005). An overview of the reputation 
rankings of the issuer mangers is provided in Table 5.3 under Section 5.1.3.   
  
 In this study, IPOs that are managed by more than one issue manager are omitted 
from the sample. This is because it is difficult to determine with precision the share 
allocation that is attributed to each issue manager in a particular IPO. The study also 
removes a total of eight IPOs there are managed by issue managers with only one IPO 
issue throughout the sample period since inferences drawn from a single issue might be 
skewed and hence not an accurate representation of the issue manager’s reputation (Fang, 
2005).  
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3.4 HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 
3.4.1  TEST FOR PRESENCE OF ANOMALIES 
 The focus of the dissertation is to test the relation between the issue manager 
reputation and the two anomalies that are unique to the IPO market. For a start, we first 
test for the presence of the two anomalies, namely the short-run underpricing and long-
run underperformance phenomena, in the Singapore IPO market. Evidence of the 
anomalies is reflected by the returns measures (IR and LR) that are significantly different 
from zero. Hence, our first two hypotheses are depicted as follows: 
 
Hypothesis 1: Test for short-run underpricing  
H10 : The average initial return (IR) of IPOs is not significantly different from zero.  
H1A: The average initial return (IR) of IPOs is significantly different from zero. 
 
Hypothesis 2: Test for long-run underperformance 
H20 : The average long-run returns (LR) of IPOs, at the 3, 6, 12 and 24 months 
cumulation interval, are not significantly different from zero.   
H2A : The average long-run returns (LR) of IPOs, at the 3, 6, 12 and 24 months 
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3.4.2 RELATION BETWEEN REP AND IR 
Extant studies conjecture that the greater the uncertainty surrounding a firm’s 
value, the larger is the magnitude of IPO mispricing (Beatty and Ritter, 1986). Hence, the 
intermediary function of the underwriter and issue manager becomes crucial in the IPO 
process in reducing the information asymmetry between the pre-issue owners and the 
investing public (Fang, 2005). From a theoretical perspective, high reputation issue 
managers with greater valuation skills and substantial reputation capital at stake are more 
likely to price new issues closer to their intrinsic value (Baron, 1982; Booth and Smith, 
1986). Consequently, we expect underpricing to decrease with improvements in issue 
manager reputation, resulting in a positive relation between REP and IR. This is often 
referred to as the certification hypothesis and is reflected as Hypothesis H3A below. 
 
However, the market power hypothesis suggests otherwise. Specifically, 
Chemmanur and Krishnan (2007) hypothesize that the high reputation underwriters, with 
the command of a higher market share in the IPO market, are able to generate greater 
market participation and optimism among investors about the future prospects of the IPO 
firms. From this standpoint, the heterogeneity in investor beliefs arising from greater 
market participation suggests that IPOs managed by high reputation issue managers 
would receive higher valuations both in the IPO market as well as the immediate post-
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Hypothesis 3: Test for the relation between REP and IR 
H30: There is no association between issue manager reputation ranking (REP) and initial 
return measure (IR).  
H3A: High reputation issue managers (REP 1) are more likely to be associated with lower 
initial return (IR) and smaller short-run underpricing.  
H3B: High reputation issue managers (REP 1) are more likely to be associated with 
higher initial return (IR) and greater short-run underpricing.  
 
3.4.3 RELATION BETWEEN REP AND LR 
Our next question is whether IPOs managed by high reputation issue managers do 
perform better in the longer-horizon. If indeed the high reputation issue managers are 
assimilated with less risky offerings (Jenkinson and Ljungqvist, 2001) and higher quality 
issues (Fang, 2005), we would expect these issues to register better aftermarket stock 
performance as compared to the IPOs managed by lower reputation issue managers. In 
more concrete terms, we hypothesize a negative relation between REP and LR as follows: 
 
Hypothesis 4: Test for the relation between REP and LR 
H40: There is no association between issue manager reputation ranking (REP) and long-
run returns measure (LR).  
H4A: High reputation issue managers (REP 1) are more likely to be associated with 
higher long-run returns (LR) and less severe underperformance over the longer 
horizon.  
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3.5 CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 In this chapter, we present a brief overview of the Singapore economy and its 
financial sector. The data set and key variables are defined in Sections 3.2 and 3.3 and 
they serve as the foundation for our hypotheses development in Section 3.4. Specifically, 
we examine the relationship between the issue manager reputation ranking and the 
aftermarket stock performances (initial return and long-run returns) of the IPOs. We 
predict that the aftermarket stock performances of the IPOs are affected by the reputation 
rankings of the issue managers. The methods employed to test the hypotheses are 
discussed in the following chapter.  
 
 
Chapter 4: Methodology 




 The study uses the conventional regression models, complemented by the sub-
sample parametric tests, to assess the impact of issue manager reputation on the short-run 
underpricing anomaly and long-run underperformance phenomenon in the IPO market. 
Before outlining the specifications of the regression models, we present the matching 
firm selection criteria and procedures employed in arriving at the benchmark portfolio 
consisting of size-and-industry matched firms.  
 
4.1 MATCHING FIRM SELECTION CRITERIA AND PROCEDURES 
 In this study, each IPO firm is matched to a non-issuing firm based on two criteria, 
namely market capitalization and industrial classification. The designated criteria attempt 
to control for the firm size effect  (Banz, 1981; Reinganum, 1981; Keim, 1983) and 
industry effect (Spiess and Afflek-Graves, 1995; Helwege and Liang, 2004) that is widely 
documented in finance literature. 
 
The study adopts a similar approach as that of Ritter (1991) for the matching of 
IPO firms to comparable firms. First, the market capitalization of all publicly traded firms 
on SGX are obtained from the Datastream financial database as at three cutoff points: 
December 31, 1996, December 31, 2000 and December 31, 2004 respectively. At each of 
the cutoff point, these firms are then sorted according to the magnitude of their market 
capitalization within their respective industrial classification. 
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To illustrate, for an IPO that is listed between 1997 and 2000, we search for a 
non-issuing firm in the same industry12 as that of the IPO firm, and attempt to find the 
closest match based on the market capitalization of the firms as at December 31, 1996. 
Similarly, an IPO that is listed within 2001 - 2004 or 2005 - 2008 is matched to a non-
issuing firm with the closest market capitalization as at December 31, 2000 or December 
31, 2004 respectively.  
 
While the market capitalization of firms taken at the three reference points is not 
the perfect comparative, it is nevertheless reasonably reliable for the matching purpose in 
this study. We are able to obtain close matches for most of the IPOs in our sample via the 
above approach. Approximately ninety-two percent of the IPOs are matched successfully 
to a non-issuing company within the same industrial classification. In addition to the two 
matching criteria, the share price data of the matched firm must also be available so as to 
facilitate the returns comparison of the IPO firms against that of the matched firms over 
the same cumulation horizon. 
 
4.2 SUB-SAMPLE PARAMETRIC TEST  
 Commonly referred to as the two-sample means test, the sub-sample parametric 
test is a widely used tool in empirical research to test for the significance of the 
differences across various sub-samples. 
 
                                                 
12
 If a matching firm in the same industry is not available, a firm with the closest market capitalization in a 
similar industry (based on the nearest Bloomberg’s sub-sector number) is used. 
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 As detailed in Section 3.3.4, our sample of IPOs is segregated into three sub-
samples according to the reputation ranking of the issue managers that the IPO firms 
engage. Recall that the high reputation issue managers are categorized into REP 1 class 
while the average reputation and low reputation issue managers are categorized into REP 
2 and REP 3 class respectively. By examining the magnitude and significance of the 
differences in the means of the variables under study, we seek to find out if the mean of 
one class (for example 1x ) is equivalent to the mean of the other class (for example 2x ). 
In simple terms, we test the null hypothesis H0: 1x  - 2x  = 0 
 
 The sub-sample parametric test employed in this study assumes a normal 
distribution. Besides the normality assumption, it also assumes that the individual sub-















=        (5.1) 
where, 
t follows a normal distribution with (n1 + n2 – 2) degrees of freedom and 





,σσ  =    Variance of group 1 and group 2 respectively 
n1, n2 =    Number of observations in group 1 and group 2 respectively 
 
 The magnitude of the t-statistics indicates whether the mean values of two sub-
samples are significantly different from one other. Large values of t imply that the null 
hypothesis can be rejected and that the two sub-samples under study are deemed to be 
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significantly different from each other. For a more robust analysis, the two-tailed test is 
employed throughout the study.  
 
4.3 REGRESSION MODELS 
 Ordinary least squares regression models are constructed to examine whether the 
reputation ranking of the issue managers (REP) is able to predict the extent of the IPO 
mispricing and long-run underperformance of the IPO firms.  
 
 The first set of regression models consists of two simple regression equations as 
follows: 
 Model 1: iii REPIR εαα ++= *10  
Model 2: iii REPLR εββ ++= *10  
where, 
IRi  =   Initial Return of the issuing firm i. 3 proxies are used namely Ri,0 , 
MARi,0 and MFARi,0 as derived in Equations 2.1, 2.2 and 2.3 
respectively.  
 
LRi =   Long-Run Return of the issuing firm i. 3 proxies are used namely 
BHRi,T , MABHRi,T  and MFABHRi,T as derived in Equations 3.1, 
3.2 and 3.3 respectively. 
 
REPi =   Reputation ranking of the issue manager engaged by the issuing firm 
i 
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α0, β0  =   Constant 
 
α1, β1  =   Explanatory power of the independent variables 
 
εi =   Error term with a mean value of zero 
 
The simple linear regression Models 1 and 2 explain the extent to which the 
independent variable REP affects the dependent variable IR and LR respectively. Built 
into the simple regression models is the inherent assumption that other factors affecting 
the dependent variable are not correlated to the issue manager reputation ranking. In view 
of this, the study also employs the multivariate regression models to explicitly control for 
other confounding factors that could simultaneously affect the REP variable as well as 
the returns variables (IR and LR). Based on previous IPO studies, three additional 
independent variables are incorporated into the above two models to proxy for ex-ante 
uncertainties surrounding the IPO (Carter, et al., 1998; Berna and Davis, 2005).  
 
The first variable is the age of the IPO firm (LNAGE). Measured as the natural 
logarithm of one plus the age of the firm at the time of listing, Ritter (1991) argues that 
firms with longer operating histories are often perceived to be of lower risk as compared 
to firms with shorter operating histories. Hence, they are more likely to generate lower 
initial returns relative to the younger firms. Counterarguments, however, posit that the 
more established the firm is, the greater is the ability of the firm to attract market 
participation and induce investor confidence. Hence, more established firms are more 
likely to be associated with higher initial returns and higher underpricing than firms that 
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are less established in the market (Firth and Liau-Tan, 1997; Chemmanur and Krishnan, 
2007). The differences in opinions make it difficult to predict a priori the direction of the 
relationship between the age variable and the initial return variable.  
 
The second variable measures the percentage of the total issue offered by the pre-
issue shareholders (SECOND). Leland and Pyle (1977) rationalize that issuers can signal 
the good quality of their IPOs by retaining a relatively large stake of ownership in the 
firm. Recognizing the confidence and commitment that the pre-issue shareholders have in 
the IPO firms, investors are likely to place higher initial valuations on the IPOs with 
smaller SECOND variable. Consequently, IPOs with smaller SECOND variable are 
associated with higher initial returns on the first day of trading. On the other hand, firms 
with high percentage of vendor shares in the issue (denoted by a larger SECOND variable) 
could convey a negative signal to potential investors about the future growth prospects of 
the firm, resulting in comparatively lower initial returns and lower underpricing. 
Therefore, we anticipate a negative coefficient for the SECOND variable.  
 
The third and last variable STDRET measures the standard deviation of the daily 
raw returns of the IPO firms over a maximum period of 504 trading days (or two years) 
commencing from the second trading day subsequent to the listing date13. The STDRET 
variable is a proxy of the riskiness of future cash flows (Johnson and Miller, 1988). 
According to the investor risk perception hypothesis (Shiller, 1988), investors must be 
                                                 
13
 A maximum period of two years is chosen so as to be consistent with the returns cumulation horizon 
which is capped at two years. Further, due to data availability constraints, we are only able to obtain the 
daily stock returns data till August 22, 2008.  
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compensated for the uncertainty arising from fluctuations in stock prices in the 
aftermarket.  Since higher risk is generally associated with higher returns, we expect 
STDRET to be positively correlated with initial return and long-run returns. In sum, the 
multivariate regression models are formulated as follows: 
 
Model 3: iiiiii STDRETSECONDLNAGEREPIR εδδδδδ +++++= ]*[]*[]*[]*[ 43210   
Model 4: iiiiii STDRETSECONDLNAGEREPLR εγγγγγ +++++= ]*[]*[]*[]*[ 43210   
where, 
IRi  =   Initial Return of the issuing firm i. 3 proxies are used namely Ri,0 , 
MARi,0 and MFARi,0 as derived in Equations 2.1, 2.2 and 2.3 
respectively.  
 
LRi =   Long-Run Return of the issuing firm i. 3 proxies are used namely 
BHRi,T , MABHRi,T  and MFABHRi,T as derived in Equations 3.1, 
3.2 and 3.3 respectively. 
 
REPi =   Reputation ranking of the issue manager engaged by the issuing firm 
i 
 
 LNAGEi =    Natural logarithm of one plus the age of the firm at the time of listing 
 
SECONDi =    Fraction of the total issue offered by pre-issue shareholders 
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STDRETi =  Standard deviation of the raw returns of the IPO firm over a 
maximum period of 504 trading days commencing from the second 
trading day after listing 
 
δ0, γ0  =   Constant 
 
δ1 , δ2 , δ3 , δ4,  =   Explanatory power of the independent variables 
γ1 , γ2 , γ3 , γ4 
 
εi =   Error term with a mean value of zero 
 
Based on our hypotheses, the coefficient of the REP variable in Regression 
Models 1 and 3 (where IR is the dependent variable) can carry either a positive or a 
negative value. As for Regression Models 2 and 4, where LR is the dependent variable, 
we expect the coefficient of the REP variable to denote a negative sign. The empirical 
results are presented in Chapter 5. 
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This chapter opens with the descriptive statistics of the study variables. Also 
documented in Section 5.1 is a comprehensive list of all issue managers based in the 
Singapore market and their reputation rankings over the sample period. The chapter next 
moves on to provide an in-depth analysis of the reputational role of issue manager on the 
short-run underpricing puzzle and long-run underperformance phenomenon in Section 
5.2 and 5.3 respectively. Thereafter, the study rounds up with a discussion of the 
plausible explanations for the results observed. 
  
5.1  DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
5.1.1  IPO DISTRIBUTION BY CALENDAR YEAR 
 Table 5.1 presents the sample distribution of IPOs listed on the Singapore 
Exchange by calendar year. Out of the 384 IPO deals, 62.2 percent were listed on the 
Main Board and the remaining 37.8 percent on SESDAQ. In terms of proceeds quantum, 
Main Board-listed IPOs raised about S$9,595.6 million, representing 89.5 percent of the 
total capital raised over the entire sample period. In comparison, SESDAQ-listed IPO 
raised only S$1,125.1 million, accounting for only 10.5 percent of the total funds raised.  
 
Statistics in Table 5.1 also suggests that IPOs listed on the Main Board are of 
larger issue size than those of SESDAQ. A typical IPO on the Main Board raised 
approximately S$40 million vis-à-vis S$8 million raised by a typical IPO on the 
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SESDAQ (measured as the average gross proceeds per IPO). The time-series trend in IPO 
activities further demonstrates the growing dominance of Main Board in terms of the 
magnitude of funds raised. With the exception of 1997, 1998 and 2002, the aggregate 
gross proceeds raised from the listings on Main Board consistently exceed the amount 
obtained through SESDAQ.  
 
 
TABLE 5.1: Distribution of Initial Public Offerings by Calendar Year 
 
The table shows the distribution of the full sample of IPOs listed on the Main Board and SESDAQ by 
calendar year. The full sample consists of 384 IPO firms which went public between January 1, 1997 and 
August 22, 2008. The number of new issues and the corresponding aggregate gross proceeds are reported 
for each calendar year. The aggregate gross proceeds, denoted in the millions of local currency (Singdollar), 
is measured as the number of shares offered to investors multiplied by the offer price of each IPO. The 
bottom two rows (in bold) show the summary in terms of the total number of IPOs and gross proceeds 
raised by the full sample, Main Board and SESDAQ respectively.  
 
  Full sample Main Board SESDAQ 
Year No. of IPOs   
Aggregate gross 
proceeds                       
(S$ millions)   
No. of 
IPOs   
Aggregate gross 
proceeds                       
(S$ millions)   
No. of 
IPOs   
Aggregate 
gross proceeds                       
(S$ millions)  
1997 8  186.0  2  60.0  6  126.0  
1998 8  57.5  2  27.8  6  29.7  
1999 28  1,798.3  19  1,728.1  9  70.2  
2000 46  945.8  30  818.7  16  127.1  
2001 27  354.5  12  271.2  15  83.3  
2002 20  155.8  6  58.3  14  97.5  
2003 43  685.5  20  538.4  23  147.1  
2004 60  1,495.5  35  1,298.1  25  197.4  
2005 48  1,073.7  34  961.5  14  112.2  
2006 35  1,277.0  26  1,213.4  9  63.6  
2007 43  1,756.1  36  1,690.1  7  66.0  
2008 18  935.0  17  930.0  1  5.0  
             
All            
years 
384  10,720.7  239  9,595.6  145  1,125.1  
100.0%  100.0%  62.2%  89.5%  37.8%  10.5%  
                         
 
 
  Chapter 5: Empirical Findings   
Page 59    
FIGURE 5.1: Issuance Activity by Calendar Year  
 
The figure shows the issuance trend of IPOs over the sample period spanning from January 1, 1997 to 
August 22, 2008. The solid line (at the bottom) represents the number of IPO deals concluded in each 
calendar year. The dotted line (above the solid line) represents the aggregate gross proceeds raised in each 
calendar year and is denoted in the millions of local currency (Singdollar). Aggregate gross proceed is 
measured as the number of shares offered to investors multiplied by the corresponding offer price of each 
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Figure 5.1 shows a graphical plot of the issuance activity over the sample period. 
Close examination of Table 5.1 and Figure 5.1 reveals that IPO activity appears to move 
in tandem with market cycles. This is particularly evident in the early years of the sample 
period where the Singapore economy was badly hit by the Asian financial crisis. The 
adverse economic climate and market uncertainties forced many issuers to hold back their 
plans to go public. Amid bearish market sentiments, only eight firms were listed in 1997 
and 1998 respectively, with 1998 recording the lowest gross proceeds raised in a single 
year.  
 
The gradual recovery of the Asian economies in 1999 and 2000 instilled 
confidence back into the domestic IPO market. The number of successful IPO deals 
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increased during the two-year period, as did the amount of capital raised. A total of 74 
IPOs deals were completed which cumulated to S$2,744.1 million.  
 
However, barely a year later, ripples triggered from the September 11 terrorists’ 
attacks on the United States and the burst of the tech bubble once again implicated the 
Singapore economy. Many IPOs were either withdrawn or postponed, resulting in a 
significant decline in overall IPO activity in 2001. With deteriorating market conditions, 
the aggregate gross proceeds obtained declined sharply from S$945.8 million in 2000 to 
S$354.5 million and S$155.8 million in 2001 and 2002 respectively.  
 
In 2003, the economy started to pick up. For the subsequent four years, the IPO 
market witnessed a period of steady growth, with over S$1 billion of gross proceeds 
posted in each of the four years of 2004, 2005, 2006 and 2007.  In 2008, the IPO market 
suffered yet another abrupt setback. The global financial crisis sparked off by the credit 
crunch in the U.S saw the IPO activity dipping to low levels again. As with past crisis, 
the IPO activity is expected to fall further in the following year as global economies slide 
into a recession for the months to come. 
 
5.1.2  IPO DISTRIBUTION BY ISSUE MANAGER 
 Table 5.2 presents the sample distribution statistics by the reputation ranking of 
the issue managers. As shown in Table 5.2, the aggregate gross proceeds and relative 
market share increase as reputation ranking of the issue manager improves. Specifically, 
REP 1 issue managers account for more than S$8 billion in proceeds, representing 
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almost 75 percent of the entire IPO market. In comparison, REP 2 and REP 3 issue 
managers account for approximately S$1.5 billion and S$1.2 billion, representing only 14 
percent and 11 percent of the IPO market respectively. This bodes well with our 
expectations given that the relative market share of the issue managers in each calendar 
year determines the reputation ranking of the issue managers.  
 
As shown in Table 5.2 below, REP 1 issue managers handle a total of 240 IPOs 
deals, accounting for 62.5 percent of overall sample. While the number of IPO deals 
managed by REP 3 issue managers is comparatively more than that managed by REP 2 
issue managers, the average IPO deal handled by the REP 3 issue managers is 
nevertheless much smaller in deal size (S$13 million per deal computed based on 
S$1,176.1 divided by 92 IPO deals) than that handled by the REP 2 issue managers (S$29 
million computed based on $1,517.9 divided by 52 IPO deals).  
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TABLE 5.2: Summary Statistics of IPOs by Reputation Class  
 
The table shows the summary statistics of the IPO firms by the reputation class of the issue managers. The 
sample of IPO firms are categorized into three classes namely the ‘high reputation’ (REP 1), ‘average 
reputation’ (REP 2) and ‘low reputation’ (REP 3) class depending on the relative market share of the issue 
manager in each calendar year. The aggregate gross proceeds, relative market share and number of new 
issues handled by each reputation class of issue managers are reported. The aggregate gross proceeds is 
defined as the aggregated amount of capital raised by all IPOs within the same reputation class and is 
computed as the number of shares offered to investors multiplied by the offer price of each IPO. The 
relative market share is measured by the aggregate gross proceeds of each reputation class expressed as a 
percentage of the aggregate gross proceeds of all three reputation classes.  The final sample consists of 384 
IPO firms which went public between January 1, 1997 and August 22, 2008. 
 










(%) No. of IPOs 
High Reputation 1 8,026.7 74.87 240 
Average Reputation 2 1,517.9 14.16 52 
Low Reputation 3 1,176.1 10.97 92 
All issue managers 
 10,720.7 100.00 384 




5.1.3  ISSUE MANAGER REPUTATION RANKING 
In this study, we present a list encompassing all the issue managers with a 
substantial presence in the local IPO scene. As shown in Table 5.3, the issue managers 
are ranked based on their aggregate gross proceeds and relative market share over the 
entire sample period. Major banks like DBS Bank, Overseas Union Bank, United 
Overseas Bank, ABN AMRO Bank and HL Bank rank high among all the issue managers 
in terms of both issue proceeds and market share. As a whole, the five banks account for 
approximately 52 percent of the entire IPO market, leaving the remaining market pie to 
be shared among the rest of the twenty-two banks. Indeed, we see that the investment 
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banking industry is a highly concentrated industry with much of the business in the hands 
of a few major players.   
 
As shown in Table 5.3, a total of twenty-seven issue managers are identified in 
this study. Deviating from previous works, we adopt a ‘twelve-month rolling’ reputation 
ranking approach when determining the reputation class of the issue managers. This 
implies that the reputation rank of the issue managers would fluctuate from year to year 
depending on the level of IPO activity undertaken by the issue managers in the year 
under study. The advantage of this approach is two-fold. First, it allows us to capture 
fairly accurately the changes in reputation of the issue managers over time. At the same 
time, it resolves the problem of amalgamating the market share of individual issue 
managers in instances of mergers or acquisitions.  
 
To furnish a complete picture, Table 5.3 reports the relative frequency of the issue 
managers being categorized into each of the reputation class based on the ‘twelve-month 
rolling’ reputation ranking approach. Do take note that although the last year of the 
sample period, 2008, consists of less than nine months of data, we shall count it as a full 
year for ease of interpretation.  
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TABLE 5.3: Reputation Ranking of Issue Managers by Aggregate Gross Proceeds 
 
The table ranks the 27 issue managers in the order of their aggregate gross proceeds and relative market 
share over the sample period. Aggregate gross proceeds is defined as the aggregated amount of capital 
raised by each issue manager over the entire sample period. Relative market share is defined as the 
aggregate gross proceeds of each issue manager expressed as a percentage of the total gross proceeds of all 
issue managers over the sample period. The sample of IPO firms are categorized into three classes namely 
the ‘high reputation’ (REP 1), ‘average reputation’ (REP 2) and ‘low reputation’ (REP 3) class depending 
on the relative market share of the issue manager in each calendar year. The relative frequency with which 
the issue manager is categorized into each of the three reputation classes is reported in columns 4, 5 and 6 
























DBS Bank Limited 1,470.3 13.71 8 2 2 12 
Overseas Union Bank Limited 1,381.4 12.89 4 0 1 5 
United Overseas Bank Limited 951.0 8.87 7 1 3 11 
ABN AMRO Bank N.V. 919.6 8.58 3 1 0 4 
HL Bank 824.7 7.69 6 0 1 7 
Stirling Coleman Capital Limited 797.8 7.44 3 0 2 5 
Boulton Capital Asia Private Limited 581.6 5.43 2 0 0 2 
Oversea-Chinese Banking Corporation 
Limited 
520.0 4.85 1 4 6 11 
Westcomb Financial Group Private 
Limited 
377.7 3.52 1 2 2 5 
CIMB-GK Securities Private Limited 335.1 3.13 3 0 1 4 
SBI E2-Capital Asia Securities Private 
Limited 
329.9 3.08 3 0 1 4 
SAC Capital Private Limited 281.3 2.62 2 0 1 3 
Hong Leong Finance  223.9 2.09 0 2 2 4 
Kim Eng Corporate Finance Private 
Limited 
218.5 2.04 0 2 3 5 
Daiwa Securities SMBC Singapore 
Limited 
218.4 2.04 1 1 2 4 
G.K. Goh Stockbrokers Private Limited 183.9 1.72 1 0 1 2 
Vickers Ballas & Co Private Limited 166.9 1.56 1 0 1 2 
Nomura Singapore Limited 156.0 1.46 1 1 0 2 
Philip Securities Private Limited 148.9 1.39 0 1 4 5 
PrimePartners Corporate Finance 
Private Limited 
143.9 1.34 2 0 2 4 
PricewaterhouseCoopers Corporate 
Finance 
114.2 1.06 0 1 1 2 
Standard Chartered Merchant Bank 
Asia Limited 
95.6 0.89 0 1 2 3 
Mitsubishi UFJ Securities (Singapore) 
Limited 
80.4 0.75 0 1 1 2 
Genesis Capital Private Limited 79.6 0.74 0 1 2 3 
China Construction Bank Corporation 74.7 0.69 0 0 4 4 
Provenance Capital Private Limited 26.7 0.25 0 0 2 2 
Keppel TatLee Bank Limited 18.7 0.17 0 0 2 2 
All issue managers 10,720.7 100.00 49 21 49 119 
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From Table 5.3, it is observed that the issue managers ranked high in the list 
enjoy fairly high profiles consistently throughout the sample period. For instance, DBS 
Bank, Overseas Union Bank, United Overseas Bank and HL Bank are ranked REP 1 
issue managers for at least four out of the twelve calendar years. In contrast, issue 
managers such as Keppel TatLee Bank, Provenance Capital, China Construction Bank 
and Genesis Capital, that are listed at the lower end of the Table, are ranked REP 3 issue 
managers for most (if not all) of the years in which the issue managers have IPO listings.       
 
Also evident from Table 5.3 is the listing history of the issue managers. Top 
ranking issue managers are typically quite established in the industry. Big domestic banks 
like DBS Bank, Oversea-Chinese Banking Corporation and United Overseas Bank are 
prominent players in the IPO market even in the early years of the sample period. Other 
candidates that have recently joined the local investment banking industry such as 
Boulton Capital Asia and Provenance Capital can be found in the list as well. Taking a 
step further, our study probes deeper by incorporating those issue managers that have left 
the industry or have undergone mergers during the sample period. These include issue 
managers like Keppel TatLee Bank, G. K. Goh Stockbrokers, Overseas Union Bank and 
Vickers Ballas and Co. With this, Table 5.3 aims to provide an extensive coverage of the 
issue managers based in Singapore. A complete list of issue managers and their 
reputation rankings is important in this study as it serves as the underlying basis for our 
subsequent analyses.  
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5.1.4  IPO CHARACTERISTICS BY REPUTATION CLASS (REP) 
Table 5.4 provides the summary statistics for the full sample of IPOs as well as 
the breakdown by the reputation class of the issue managers. This presentation facilitates 
a univariate examination of the IPO characteristics in relation to the issue manager 
reputation class.  
 
To start with, Table 5.4 Column A reports the mean (median) values of the market 
capitalization, PE ratio, firm age, vendor share proportion as well as the standard 
deviation of post-issue stock returns for the full sample. On average, an IPO firm listed 
on SGX has a mean market capitalization of S$116.22 million, mean PE ratio of 14.1 
times as well as a mean of 5.56 years of operating history at the time of listing. In 
addition, approximately 9.9 percent of the issue size belongs to the existing pre-issue 
shareholders (SECOND). Comparing this against a typical IPO in the United States, we 
find that issuers in the local market are smaller in size, more conservative in valuations, 
less established in history and offer fewer secondary shares vis-à-vis their U.S 
counterparts (Kim and Ritter, 1999; Carter, et al., 1998) The significant differences in 
issue and issuer characteristics between the local market and U.S. IPO market indicates 
that an in-depth study on the Singapore IPOs is therefore warranted. 
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TABLE 5.4: IPO Characteristics by Reputation Class 
 
Table values represent the mean (median) statistics for the full sample as well as for the respective 
reputation class. The sample of IPO firms are categorized into three classes namely the ‘high reputation’ 
(REP 1), ‘average reputation’ (REP 2) and ‘low reputation’ (REP 3) class depending on the relative market 
share of the issue manager in each calendar year. Market capitalization is based on the issue price and the 
post-IPO share capital. PE ratio is the price-earnings ratio, measured by taking the offer price divided by 
the net earnings-per-share (EPS), where net EPS is the net earnings obtained from the latest audited 
financial statements and based on the number of shares held prior to the IPO. Age is the number of years 
the company is in operation from the date of incorporation to the date of listing. SECOND measures the 
percentage of the issue offered by pre-issue shareholders. STDRET is the standard deviation of daily 
returns over a maximum period of 504 trading days commencing from the second trading day subsequent 
to listing date. a, b, c, signify that the difference between the means of columns B and D, columns C and D, 
and columns B and C is significant at the 10 percent level using the sub-sample parametric means test. The 
final sample consists of 384 IPO firms that went public between January 1, 1997 and August 22, 2008. 
 
 
   Issue Manager Reputation Ranking 
 
  High Reputation Average Reputation Low Reputation 
  All IPOs REP 1 REP 2 REP 3 
Issue and Firm Characteristics  (A) (B) (C) (D) 
Market Capitalization (S$ in million)  116.22 142.55 a, c 107.99 b 52.17 
  (63.84) (72.60) (66.34) (39.40) 
PE Ratio (times)  14.10 16.97 a, c 9.69 9.11 
  (8.48) (8.90) (7.26) (7.81) 
Age (years)  5.56 5.72 6.11 4.82 
  (1.38) (1.44) (1.33) (1.32) 
SECOND (%)  9.90 10.00 12.87 b 7.95 
  (0.00) (0.00) (2.92) (0.00) 
STDRET (%)  4.12 4.06 a 3.83 b 4.42 
  (3.92) (3.83) (3.68) (4.25) 
      
Number of IPOs  384 240 52 92 
           
 
 
Table 5.4 Columns B, C and D present the mean (median) values of the IPO 
characteristics for REP 1 issue managers, REP 2 issue managers and REP 3 issue 
managers respectively. Pairwise significance tests of differences between issue and issuer 
characteristics are provided for these three sub-samples using the conventional parametric 
means test. Our tests results demonstrate that there exist systematic differences across the 
three reputation sub-samples. Particularly, it is observed that the IPOs managed by the 
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high reputation issue managers have, on average, larger market capitalization and higher 
PE ratios than those managed by either the average or low reputation issue managers.  
 
Table 5.4 also provides an indication of the riskiness of the issues through the 
standard deviation measure of post-issue stock returns (STDRET). Specifically, the 
average STDRET is noted to be significantly higher in issues managed by REP 1 and 
REP 3 issue managers, with REP 3 issue managers recording the highest STDRET 
among the three reputation classes. This implies that issues managed by the high 
reputation and low reputation issue managers are associated with higher risk, which could 
potentially have an impact on the aftermarket stock performances of the IPO firms.  
 
Summing up, collective evidence appears to suggest that issue managers are 
rather selective in the IPOs they undertake. This motivates us to test if a direct 
relationship does prevail between the issue manager reputation profile and the 
aftermarket stock performance of the IPO firms.  
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5.2 UNDERPRICNG PHENOMENON 
5.2.1 PRELIMINARY EVIDENCE – PE RATIO 
The value relevance of PE ratios in stock pricing decisions has been well 
documented in academic literature (Zarowin, 1990; Liu and Ziebart, 1994). As depicted 
in Table 5.4, we find that the higher reputation issue managers are associated with 
significantly higher PE ratios, hinting that higher reputation issue managers are better at 




TABLE 5.5 PE Ratios and Issue Manager Reputation Ranking 
 
This table reports the mean price-to-earnings (PE) ratios for the sample of IPO firms categorized into three 
reputation classes (REP 1, REP 2 and REP 3) and their corresponding portfolio of non-issuing size-and-
industry matched firms. Mean PE ratio of the IPO firms is measured by taking the offer price divided by 
the net earnings-per-share (EPS), where net EPS is the net earnings obtained from the latest audited 
financial statements and based on the number of shares held prior to the IPO. Mean PE ratio of the size-
and-industry matched firms is measured by taking the ending market price of the matched firm as at the 
IPO firm’s closing subscription date divided by the net earnings-per-share reported in the matched firm’s 
latest audited financial statements. The difference in mean PE ratio of the IPO firms and the size-and-
industry matched firms are reported in the last column. N denotes the number of IPO firms in each 
reputation class. The t-statistics is shown in parentheses. ***, ** and * signify that the mean PE ratio is 
significant at the 1 percent, 5 percent and 10 percent levels respectively (two-tailed). The final sample 











Issue Manager Reputation Ranking N (A) - (B) 
REP 1 (High Reputation) 240      16.97      32.00      -15.03 
       (5.15) ***      (4.97) ***      (-2.08) ** 
REP 2 (Average Reputation) 52      9.69      72.72      -63.03 
       (7.61) ***      (1.41)      (-1.22) 
REP 3 (Low Reputation) 92      9.11      33.22      -24.11 
       (5.36) ***      (3.07) ***      (-2.23) ** 
All IPOs 384      14.10      37.81      -23.71 
         (6.67) ***      (4.47) ***       (-2.72) *** 
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In practice, major investment banks do not rely solely on firm-specific accounting 
data in the pricing of IPOs. Instead, issue managers frequently draw reference to the 
accounting multiples of a peer group when valuing IPOs (Pratt, 1989; DeAngelo, 1990; 
Joyce and Roosma, 1991). Recognizing the importance of comparable firm multiples in 
the IPO pricing decisions, Table 5.5 reports the PE ratios of the portfolio of size-and-
industry-matched firms, alongside with the PE ratios of the IPO firms. Our results reveal 
that the mean PE ratios of IPO firms are constantly below that of their industry peers. 
Across the three reputation classes, the mean PE ratio of the IPO firms range between 
9.11 and 16.97 times while that of the matching firms range between 32 and 72.72 times.  
 
Formal statistical tests on the mean differences between the issuers’ PE ratio and 
their peer group’s PE ratio demonstrate that the average PE ratio of IPOs managed by 
high reputation issue managers is, on average, 15.03 times lower than their peer group 
(please refer to the last column of Table 5.5). Similarly, the mean PE ratio of IPOs 
managed by low reputation issue managers is significantly lower than that of their peer 
group by approximately 24.11 times.  
 
The empirical findings in Table 5.5 indicate that IPOs managed by both the high 
and low reputation issue managers (REP 1 and REP 3) are substantially discounted 
relative to their industry peers. Preliminary evidence suggests that certain groups of IPOs 
listed on the Singapore Exchange are considerably underpriced. To reaffirm our 
conjecture, the study next examines the initial stock price performance of the IPO firms. 
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Specifically, we seek to find out if the extent of mispricing differs considerably among 
the three classes of issue managers with varying levels of reputation. 
 
5.2.2  PRESENCE OF ANOMALY 
To test for the presence of mispricing, the initial stock returns of the IPO firms are 
reported in Table 5.6. From Panel A, the mean initial return for the full sample is 12.4 
percent, statistically significant at the 1 percent level. The positive initial return observed 
indicates the presence of prevalent underpricing in the local IPO market.  
 
In line with prior IPO research, this study also adjusts the initial return of the IPO 
firm for the contemporaneous return of the market index (Carter, et al., 1998) as well as 
the contemporaneous return of a comparable firm (Ritter, 1991). Again, the results show 
that the market-adjusted initial return and matched-firm adjusted initial return remain 
significantly positive, reinforcing the fact that IPOs listed on the Singapore Exchange are 
heavily underpriced. According to Lee, et al. (1996) and Firth and Liau-Tan (1997), the 
underpricing phenomenon is noted to be more prominent in the domestic market.  
Saunders and Lim (1990) 14  postulate that this could likely be due to the unique 
institutional arrangements prevalent in the country.  
                                                 
14
 Saunders and Lim (1990) point to the massive over subscription and rationing mechanism (refer to 
Section 3.1.4) as plausible reasons for the higher degree of underpricing observed in the domestic market. 
The general absence of a competitive tendering among underwriting groups, coupled with issuers’ concerns 
over future access to equity markets and potential litigation risk also contribute to the prevalent 
underpricing phenomenon in the domestic market, which is noted to be more severe vis-à-vis other markets.   
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TABLE 5.6: Statistics on Initial Return (IR) 
 
This table reports the mean raw initial return, market-adjusted initial return and matching firm-adjusted 
initial return for the full sample of IPO firms as well as for the respective reputation class (REP 1, REP 2 
and REP 3). Raw initial return (Ri,0) is the difference between the first day closing price and the offer price 
of the IPO firm. Market-adjusted initial return (MARi,0) is measured as the raw initial return of the IPO firm 
less the contemporaneous return of the Straits Times Index. Matched firm-adjusted initial return (MFARi,0), 
is measured as raw initial return of the IPO firm less the contemporaneous return of the non-issuing size-
and-industry matched firm. N denotes the number of IPO firms in each reputation class. The t-statistics is 
shown in parentheses. ***, ** and * signify that the mean initial return is significant at the 1 percent, 5 
percent and 10 percent levels respectively (two-tailed). a, b, c, signify that the difference between the means 
of REP 1 and REP 3, REP 2 and REP 3, and REP 1 and REP 2 is significant at the 10 percent level using 
the sub-sample parametric means test. The final sample consists of 384 IPO firms that went public between 
January 1, 1997 and August 22, 2008. 
 
Initial Return  
  Raw  Market-adjusted Matched firm-adjusted 
N initial return initial return initial return 
  
   (Ri,0) (MARi,0) (MFARi,0) 
Panel A - Initial Return for the pooled sample 
  
 
All IPOs  384      0.124         0.125              0.123 











Panel B - Initial Returns by Issue Manager Reputation Ranking
 
 
REP 1 (High reputation)  240      0.154a         0.154 a              0.151a 
        (4.655)***         (4.688)***              (4.557)*** 
REP 2 (Average reputation)  52      0.116         0.118              0.114 
        (2.013)**         (2.054)**              (1.999)* 
REP 3 (Low reputation)  92      0.053         0.054              0.057 
        (1.189)         (1.206)              (1.246) 
  
    
      
 
 The sample is further segregated into three sub-samples according to the 
reputation ranking of the issue managers as shown in Panel B. This breakdown allows us 
to examine the extent of underpricing across the various classes of issue managers.  
Positive initial returns are reported for all three sub-samples, even after controlling for 
market movements, industry effect and size factor. Closer inspection reveals that the 
degree of underpricing appears to be most severe for the sub-sample of IPOs managed by 
the high reputation issue managers. In quantitative terms, the issues managed by the high 
reputation issue managers experience about 15 percent of underpricing. Issues managed 
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by the average and low reputation issue managers record about 11 percent and 5 percent 
of underpricing respectively.  
 
Our pairwise significance tests of differences between the three sub-samples 
confirm that issues belonging to the high reputation issue managers experience the 
greatest degree of underpricing as compared to the issues belonging to either the average 
reputation issue managers and the low reputation issue managers. This is consistent with 
the market power hypothesis documented by Chemmanur and Krishnan (2007) who 
argue that high reputation issue managers, given their substantial market share and 
influence in the investment banking industry, are able to obtain higher market valuations 
for their clients both in the IPO market as well as the immediate post-issue secondary 
market.  
 
While suggestive evidence hints that the level of IPO underpricing is positively 
associated with the reputation of the issue manager, it is equally important to ensure that 
differences in the issue and issuer characteristics are appropriately factored into the 
analysis in order to derive a robust conclusion. In view of this, we proceed with the 
regression analyses in an attempt to control for possible confounding factors that could 
drive the univariate results as described in Table 5.6.  
 
5.2.3  REGRESSION ANALYSES 
 Our univariate results in Section 5.2.2 show that IPOs managed by high reputation 
issue managers have higher underpricing than the IPOs managed by low reputation issue 
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managers. Consistent with the earlier results, Table 5.7 Panel A reports a unanimous 
negative coefficient for REP variable in all three versions of the simple regression model 
(Model 1). The negative and significant coefficient of 0.05 reinforces the notion that high 
reputation issue managers are associated with larger initial returns and greater short-run 
underpricing.  
 
From Table 5.7 Panel A, it is noted that the adjusted R2 of the simple regression is 
relatively low. Ranging between 0.005 and 0.007, the low values of R2 suggest that other 
important factors could have been omitted from the simple regression model. To enhance 
the power of our tests, three independent variables are incorporated in the subsequent 
multivariate regression model namely firm age, proportion of vendor shares and the 
standard deviation of post-issue stock returns (Carter, et al., 1998; Berna and Davis, 
2005).  
 
As evident from the regression statistics in Table 5.7 Panel B, the adjusted R2 
increase modestly after incorporating the above three independent variables in Model 3. 
More importantly, our results confirm the inverse relationship between the issue manager 
reputation ranking and the level of initial underpricing, even after controlling for firm 
age, proportion of vendor shares and standard deviation of post-issue stock returns 
performance of the IPO firms.  The consistent negative and significant REP coefficient 
reinforces our conjecture that the reputation of issue managers plays a significant role in 
determining the immediate price performance of the IPO firms. 
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Our multivariate regression results also indicate that firms offering fewer vendor 
shares are associated with higher initial returns and greater levels of underpricing, though 
the association is fairly weak in terms of statistical significance. Leland and Pyle (1977) 
purport that by retaining a large stake in the ownership of the IPO firm, pre-issue 
shareholders are able to send a strong signal to potential investors of the positive outlook 
and growth prospects, causing the share price of IPO firms to shore up on the first day of 
trading. In contrast, the LNAGE and STDRET coefficients do not seem to have any 
significant influence on initial returns as reflected by their low t-statistics in the 
multivariate regression results.  
 
In sum, the result on the short-run returns performance of IPOs is largely 
consistent with the market power hypothesis under Hypothesis H3B (see Section 3.4.2). 
Our results parallel the findings of Beatty and Welch (1996), Cooney, et al. (2000) and 
Bates and Dunbar (2002) who also document that high reputation underwriters based in 
the U.S. are more likely to be associated with greater short-run underpricing than the low 
reputation underwriters. Using Singapore as the research setting, similar observation is 
noted by Lee, et al. (1996) and Reber and Fong (2006). In spite of this, little is mentioned 
on the reasons for the observation. Section 5.4 of this chapter attempts to provide some 
plausible explanations for the observed relationship. 
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TABLE 5.7 
 
Cross-Sectional Regressions Explaining Initial Return (IR) 
 
The table presents the results of ordinary least square regression of initial return (IR) on the issue manager reputation ranking (REP).  3 proxies of initial return 
are used. Raw initial return (Ri,0) is the difference between the first day closing price and the offer price of the IPO firm. Market-adjusted initial return (MARi,0) 
is measured as the raw initial return of the IPO firm less the contemporaneous return of the Straits Times Index. Matched firm-adjusted initial return (MFARi,0), 
is measured as raw initial return of the IPO firm less the contemporaneous return of the non-issuing size-and-industry matched firm. Four independent variables 
are included. REP measures the issue manager reputation ranking. It is a discrete ranking variable ranging from 1 to 3, where REP 1 (3) consists of IPOs 
managed by the high (low) reputation issue managers. LNAGE is the natural logarithm of one plus the age of the firm at the time of listing. SECOND measures 
the fraction of the total issue offered by pre-issue shareholders. STDRET is the standard deviation of raw returns over a maximum period of 504 trading days 
commencing from the second trading day after listing. The t-statistics is shown in parentheses.  ***, ** and * signify that the variable is significant at the 1 percent, 
5 percent and 10 percent levels respectively. The final sample consists of 384 IPO firms that went public between January 1, 1997 and August 22, 2008. Details 
of Regression Models 1 and 3 are discussed in Section 4.3.   
 
Model 1:  IRi = α0 + α1 * REPi + εi 
  
Model 3:  IRi = δ0 + [δ1 * REPi] + [δ2 * LNAGEi] + [δ3 * SECONDi] + [δ4 * STDRETi] + εi  
 
Dependent variable Intercept REP LNAGE SECOND STDRET F-Statistics Adjusted R2 
Panel A - Regression Model 1        
Raw initial return (Ri,0) 0.204 -0.049    2.886* 0.005 
 (3.862)*** (-1.699)*      
Market-adjusted initial return (MARi,0) 0.204 -0.049    2.885* 0.007 
 (3.884)*** (-1.698)*      
Matched firm-adjusted initial return (MFARi,0) 0.198 -0.046    2.511 0.007 
 (3.728)*** (-1.585)      
                
Panel B - Regression Model 3        
Raw initial return (Ri,0) 0.231 -0.052 -0.007 -0.263 0.311 1.418 0.015 
 (2.431)** (-1.783)* (-0.280) (-1.631) (0.181)   
Market-adjusted initial return (MARi,0) 0.232 -0.052 -0.008 -0.259 0.316 1.405 0.015 
 (2.448)** (-1.784)* (-0.310) (-1.613) (0.184)   
Matched firm-adjusted initial return (MFARi,0) 0.213 -0.049 -0.006 -0.282 0.622 1.454 0.015 
 (2.233)** (-1.689)* (-0.227) (-1.740)* (0.361)   
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5.3  UNDERPERFORMANCE PHENOMENON 
5.3.1  PRESENCE OF ANOMALY 
 Having examined the initial stock performance of the IPO firms, we move on to 
analyze the price performance of IPO stocks over a holding period that stretches across 
twenty-four months. Figure 5.2 provides a graphical plot to illustrate how the stock prices 
evolve over time. For comparative purposes, the corresponding stock price performance 
of the market index as well as that of the portfolio of comparable firms are also presented 
in the Figure below.  
 
FIGURE 5.2: Buy-and-Hold Returns of IPO Firms, STI and Matched Firms 
 
This figure shows the average buy-and-hold returns for the IPO firms, Straits Times Index (STI) and the 
portfolio of size-and-industry matched firms. The buy-and-hold returns exclude the first-day return. The 
holding period spans over 24 months beginning from the second trading day from the date of listing. The 
black shaded bars represent the average buy-and-hold returns of IPO firms over various holding horizons. 
The non-shaded cylindrical bars represent the average buy-and-hold returns of the STI. The gray shaded 
bars represent the average buy-and-hold returns of the portfolio of size-and-industry matched firms. The 
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As evident from the plot, IPO firms constantly underperform both the market 
index as well as their industry peers over the entire two-year window. Recording negative 
cumulative returns for the three months, six months and twelve months holding horizons, 
the IPO firms manage to turn around the poor performance at the second anniversary. 
Despite this, IPOs firms continue to underperform substantially relative to the broad 
market index and comparable firms in the same industry over the longer horizon.  
 
 To examine the dynamics of the IPO returns performance in greater detail, Table 
5.8 reports the buy-and-hold returns statistics for the full sample as well as the 
breakdown by the reputation class of the issue managers. As observed in Panels B and C, 
the market-adjusted and matched firm-adjusted buy-and-hold returns for the pooled data 
are significant and negative across the four holding periods under study. Notably, the 
magnitude of the excess buy-and-hold returns for the full sample exhibits a declining 
trend as the holding horizon increases. This corroborates with prior findings and signals 
the presence of the long-run underperformance anomaly in the Singapore IPO market.  
 
 To examine the effects of issue manager reputation on the long-run performance 
of the IPO firms, the sample is again segregated into the three sub-samples according to 
the reputation ranking of the issue managers (REP 1, REP 2 and REP 3). Carter, et al. 
(1998) document that IPOs managed by high reputation underwriters are likely to register 
better aftermarket performance than the IPOs managed by the low reputation ones. While 
our initial observations reaffirm that the long-run underperformance is less severe for 
IPOs associated with the high reputation issue managers (REP 1) vis-à-vis their lower 
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reputation counterparts (REP 3), the impact of the issue manager reputation on long-run 
return performance is less conclusive if the performance of the REP 1 issue managers is 
compared against the REP 2 issue managers. Only in designated returns accumulation 
periods such as the market-adjusted buy-and-hold returns for twenty-four months as well 
as the matched firm-adjusted buy-and-hold returns for six months, twelve months and 
twenty-four months, do we observe the unidirectional declining trend in buy-and-hold 
returns across the reputation classes.  
 
In order to test the robustness of the long-run returns across the three reputation 
sub-samples, the results of the sub-sample parametric means tests are also included in 
Table 5.8. Surprisingly, we find that the returns performance does not appear to differ 
significantly across issue managers with different reputation rankings. This, coupled with 
the absence of a consistent pattern in the long-run returns across varying issue manager 
prestige level, suggests that the reputational role of issue managers on the returns 
performance is fairly limited in the long run post-issue period. To deduce more 
conclusive inferences on the impact of issue manager reputation on the after-market 
performance of IPO, we present the regression results in the following section. 
 
For simplicity, the subsequent tests conducted in this study will focus on the 
matched-firm adjusted long-run returns performance of the IPO firms. Dimson and Marsh 
(1986) and Ritter (1991) argue that in event studies with long windows, it is critical to 
select an appropriate benchmark for an accurate evaluation of the long-run performance 
of IPOs. Since the comparable firm portfolio consists of firms that closely match the IPO 
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TABLE 5.8: Statistics on Long-Run Returns (LR) 
 
This table reports the mean raw buy-and-hold returns, market-adjusted buy-and-hold returns and matched 
firm-adjusted buy-and-hold returns for the full sample of IPO firms as well as for the respective reputation 
class (REP 1, REP 2 and REP 3) over the holding periods of 3, 6, 12 and 24 months. Panel A presents the 
raw buy-and-hold returns (BHRi,T) measured as the daily compounded returns from a buy-and-hold strategy 
where the IPO stock is purchased at a price equivalent to the market price at the end of the first trading day. 
Panel B presents the market-adjusted buy-and-hold returns (MABHRi,T) measured as the raw buy-and-hold 
returns of the IPO firm less the contemporaneous compounded returns of the Straits Times Index. Panel C 
presents the matched firm-adjusted buy-and-hold returns (MFABHRi,T) measured as the raw buy-and-hold 
returns of the IPO firm less the contemporaneous compounded returns of the non-issuing size-and-industry 
matched firm.  The number of IPO firms in each sub-sample is shown in parentheses.  ***, ** and * signify 
that the mean long-run returns is significant at the 1 percent, 5 percent and 10 percent levels respectively 
(two-tailed). a, b, c, signify that the difference between the means of REP 1 and REP 3, REP 2 and REP 3, 
and REP 1 and REP 2 is significant at the 10 percent level using the sub-sample parametric means test. The 
sample period is from January 1, 1997 to August 22, 2008. 
 
Holding Periods (T) 3 months 6 months 12 months 24 months 
Panel A - Raw Buy-and-Hold Returns (BHRi,T) 
All Firms -0.057*** -0.059** -0.051 0.037 
 (374) (369) (352) (311) 
 
    
REP 1 (High reputation) -0.032c -0.040 -0.040 0.042 
 (233) (232) (223) (200) 
REP 2 (Average reputation) -0.109*** -0.099 0.061 0.078 
 (51) (50) (48) (39) 
REP 3 (Low reputation) -0.093** -0.087* -0.146** -0.001 
 (90) (87) (81) (72) 
     
Panel B - Market-Adjusted Buy-and-Hold Returns (MABHRi,T) 
All Firms -0.078*** -0.096*** -0.133*** -0.164*** 
 (374) (369) (352) (311) 
 
    
REP 1 (High reputation) -0.058** -0.076** -0.118*** -0.145* 
 (233) (232) (223) (200) 
REP 2 (Average reputation) -0.124*** -0.152** -0.067 -0.189* 
 (51) (50) (48) (39) 
REP 3 (Low reputation) -0.102** -0.116** -0.211*** -0.205** 
 (90) (87) (81) (72) 
 
Panel C - Matched Firm-Adjusted Buy-and-Hold Returns (MFABHRi,T) 
All Firms -0.060*** -0.062** -0.098** -0.132* 
 (374) (369) (352) (311) 
 
    
REP 1 (High reputation) -0.039c -0.029 -0.044a -0.057 
 (233) (232) (223) (200) 
REP 2 (Average reputation) -0.149*** -0.115 -0.066 -0.091 
 (51) (50) (48) (39) 
REP 3 (Low reputation) -0.062 -0.118* -0.265*** -0.363** 
 (90) (87) (81) (72) 
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firms in terms of market capitalization and industrial classification, it is thus deemed to 
be the most appropriate benchmark portfolio for our analysis. Therefore, our analyses 
will solely report the results of regressions using the matched-firm adjusted buy-and-hold 
returns as the independent variable.  
 
5.3.2  REGRESSION ANALYSES 
 Table 5.9 Panels A and B presents the results for Regression Models 2 and Model 
4 respectively. The reputational impact of issuer manager on long-run stock price 
performance of IPO firms is directly reflected through the statistical significance and 
magnitude of the REP coefficient in Model 2 (Table 5.9 Panel A). Extending the findings 
in Section 5.3.1, we find that the coefficient of the REP variable is negative and 
significant when the twelve months and twenty-four months excess returns are employed 
as the independent variables. This indicates that high reputation issue managers are more 
likely to be associated with higher long run returns and less underperformance in the 
longer horizon.  
 
 The explanatory power of the simple regression model is also shown in Table 5.9 
Panel A. Low R2 values attest to the fact that there are other factors affecting the investor 
returns over the longer time horizons.  The introduction of three independent variables 
namely firm age, proportion of vendor shares and standard deviation of post-issue stock 
returns improves the overall model fit modestly from a R2 of less than 0.01 to about 0.02. 
More notably, the effect of issue manager reputation on the excess returns diminishes 
substantially upon controlling for firm age, proportion of vendor shares and standard 
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deviation of post-issue stock returns. With the exception of the twelve months excess 
return regression, where the reputation ranking of the issue manager is marginally 
significant at the 10 percent level, the reputation of the issue manager appears to have 
very little predictive power for the long-run returns performance of IPO firms. The 
implications of the findings are discussed in the following section.  
 
It is worth noting that the coefficient for STDRET variable is statistically 
significant in all the multivariate regressions. Recall that the STDRET variable acts as a 
proxy for the riskiness of future cash flows. A negative STDRET coefficient suggests that 
IPOs with greater returns volatilities earn lower long-run returns. Although the sign of the 
STDRET runs contrary to our expectations, it is not totally unexpected. In conventional 
finance theories, it is stated that the greater the risk of the firm, the larger is the 
fluctuation in returns. The bleak economic outlook following the 1997 Asian economic 
crisis, 2001 terrorist attacks and the bursting of the tech bubble could have exerted 
downward pressure on the price performance of the high-risk IPO firms. Notwithstanding 
the above, the overall explanatory power of the model is considerably weak, possibly 
indicating the greater importance of other omitted firm-specific factors in explaining the 
longer horizon excess returns.  
             Chapter 5: Empirical Findings          
                  
Page 83   
TABLE 5.9 
 
 Cross-Sectional Regressions Explaining Long-Run Returns (LR) 
 
The table presents the results of ordinary least square regression of the long-run returns (LR) on the issue manager reputation ranking (REP) over the holding 
periods of 3, 6, 12 and 24 months. The matched firm-adjusted buy-and-hold returns (MFABHR) is used to proxy for long-run returns. It is measured as the raw 
buy-and-hold returns of the IPO firm less the contemporaneous compounded returns of the non-issuing size-and-industry matched firm. Four independent 
variables are included. REP measures the issue manager reputation ranking. It is a discrete ranking variable ranging from 1 to 3, where REP 1 (3) consists of 
IPOs managed by the high (low) reputation issue managers. LNAGE is the natural logarithm of one plus the age of the firm at the time of listing. SECOND 
measures the fraction of the total issue offered by pre-issue shareholders. STDRET is the standard deviation of raw returns over a maximum period of 504 
trading days commencing from the second trading day after listing. N denotes the number of observations used in each regression. The t-statistics is shown in 
parentheses.  ***, ** and * signify that the variable is significant at the 1 percent, 5 percent and 10 percent levels respectively. The sample period is from January 1, 
1997 to August 22, 2008. Details of Regression Models 2 and 4 are discussed in Section 4.3.   
 
Model 2:  LRi = β0 + β 1 * REPi + εi 
  
Model 4:  LRi = γ0 + [γ1 * REPi] + [γ2 * LNAGEi] + [γ3 * SECONDi]  + [γ4 * STDRETi] + εi  
 
Dependent variable Intercept REP LNAGE SECOND STDRET F-Statistics Adjusted R2 N 
Panel A - Regression Model 2         
3-Month MFABHR -0.030 -0.019    0.489 -0.001 374 
 (-0.613) (-0.700)       
6-Month MFABHR 0.014 -0.047    1.729 0.002 369 
 (0.221) (-1.315)       
12-Month MFABHR 0.068 -0.104    3.902** 0.008 352 
 (0.717) (-1.975)**       
24-Month MFABHR 0.097 -0.144    2.770* 0.006 311 
  (0.623) (-1.664)*             
Panel B - Regression Model 4         
3-Month MFABHR 0.193 -0.010 -0.011 -0.069 -5.305 2.440** 0.015 374 
 (2.127)** (-0.382) (-0.471) (-0.469) (-2.978)***    
6-Month MFABHR 0.271 -0.035 0.002 0.016 -6.918 2.479** 0.016 369 
 (2.191)** (-0.974) (0.063) (0.081) (-2.823)***    
12-Month MFABHR 0.393 -0.088 0.019 -0.087 -9.064 2.638** 0.018 352 
 (2.184)** (-1.670)* (0.437) (-0.306) (-2.556)**    
24-Month MFABHR 0.828 -0.121 -0.078 0.082 -16.778 3.002** 0.025 311 
  (2.722)*** (-1.389) (-1.072) (0.180) (-2.729)***       
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5.4 IMPLICATIONS OF FINDINGS 
 This section discusses the plausible reasons for the observed reputational impact 
of issue managers on the valuations and post-issue price performances of IPO firms listed 
on the Singapore Exchange.  
 
 For decades, the economic role of the underwriter / issue manager has been the 
subject of much heated debate. While the prevailing view of the underwriter is that of a 
‘certifying’ intermediary whose role is to reduce the information asymmetry between the 
pre-issue owners and the investing public, recent empirical findings however suggest 
otherwise. Specifically, Beatty and Welch (1996), Loughran and Ritter (2004) and 
Cooney, et al. (2000) find that the IPOs underwritten by high reputation investment banks 
are characterized by greater underpricing especially in recent years. Our analysis of the 
Singapore IPO market paint a similar picture, with higher reputation issue managers 
registering higher initial returns than their less reputable counterparts.  
 
 Chemmanur and Krishnan (2007) attribute the above to the market power of the 
underwriters. According to the researchers, the high reputation underwriters, being more 
established in the industry, are able to attract greater market participation among the 
institutional investors and gain higher quality analysts’ coverage on the IPOs. This, in 
turn, leads to greater optimism among the investor community about the future prospects 
of the firm. Consequently, IPOs managed by high reputation issue managers receive 
higher valuations in both the IPO market as well as the immediate secondary market 
(Miller, 1977; Morris, 1996).  
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As hypothesize by the researchers, the reputational role of the issue managers 
does not disappear immediately. Rather, the impact of high quality market participants, 
who are attracted by the high reputation of the issue managers, typically persists for some 
time after the IPO. This is evident from negative and significant coefficient of the REP 
variable in the twelve-month return regression. Nevertheless, with the lengthening of 
time horizon, the reputation impact of the issue manager dissipates as investors receive 
more information about the IPO firm. Instead, the firm-specific factors and 
macroeconomic conditions take on an increasingly important role in explaining the price 
performance of the IPO firms over the longer horizon (Logue, et al., 2002). 
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 In this concluding chapter, we first highlight the main findings in Section 6.1. The 
implications of the study are presented in Sections 6.2. Finally, the chapter closes with 
Section 6.3 discussing on the limitations and areas for future research. 
 
6.1  SUMMARY OF THE STUDY 
Empirical research on the reputational role of underwriters has been largely U.S 
centric. This study sheds new light to the literature by examining the impact of issue 
manager reputation profile on the short-run underpricing and long-run underperformance 
phenomena in the Singapore IPO market. Specifically, a new method of measuring the 
reputation of the issue managers is developed in the paper. Using the ‘twelve-month 
rolling’ reputation ranking approach, we present a comprehensive ranking of all the issue 
managers based in Singapore with a substantial presence in the local IPO scene.  
 
Notably, this research advances our knowledge of the domestic IPO market in 
several ways. First, it demonstrates the presence of prevalent short-run underpricing and 
long-run underperformance in the Singapore IPO market. Consistent with previous 
studies, we find that issuers in the domestic market generally fail to fully incorporate the 
information on investor demand when setting the IPO offer price. Consequently, the IPOs 
exhibit considerable price rises on the first day of trading. Unfortunately, the aftermarket 
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performance of IPOs is ‘lackluster’. Over a longer horizon, we find that IPO firms 
constantly underperform the broad market index as well as their industry peers.   
 
Second, our findings show that the degree of underpricing appears to be most 
severe for the sub-sample of IPOs managed by the high reputation issue managers. 
Specifically, the results from conventional univariate sub-sample comparisons as well as 
multivariate regression analyses suggest that higher reputation issue managers are 
generally associated with larger initial returns and greater short-run underpricing. This is 
in line with the market power hypothesis (Chemmanur and Krishnan, 2007) which states 
that high reputation issue managers, given their substantial market share and influence in 
the investment banking industry, are able to attract market participants of higher quality 
to the IPOs. In more concrete terms, high reputation issue managers have the ability to 
generate greater overall optimism in the IPOs among the investor community, leading to 
higher market valuations and higher levels of underpricing as witnessed in the study. 
 
 Lastly, we show that the reputation of the issue managers appear to have little 
predictive power for the long run return performance of the IPO firms. Tracking the three 
months, six months, twelve months and twenty-four months buy-and-hold returns 
performance of IPO firms, we observe that the reputation of the issue managers is 
statistically significant in the twelve-month return window only. With the passage of time, 
the reputational impact of the issue managers diminishes and fades away as investors 
receive more information about the IPO firms. In sum, the knowledge on the reputation 
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profile of the issue managers provides useful insights on the pre-issue valuation and 
immediate post-issue aftermarket stock performance of the IPO firms. 
 
6.2  IMPLICATIONS OF THE STUDY 
 The results presented in the study strongly support the market power hypothesis 
put forth by Chemmanur and Krishnan (2007). Contrary to the frequently cited 
‘certification hypothesis’ of a negative relationship between the underwriter reputation 
and IPO underpricing, the findings from the domestic IPO market reinforces the fact that 
the negative relationship documented in the past has seen a reversal in recent years. 
 
Essentially, our results suggest that the reputation standing of the issue managers 
contains informational value that allows market participants to infer the post-issue price 
performance of IPO firms in the secondary market. This has important implications for 
market participants like investors, issuers and regulators. First, from the investors’ 
perspective, the reputation standing of issue managers would undoubtedly facilitate their 
decision-making. Since the IPOs managed by high reputation issue managers are 
generally associated with higher pre-issue valuations, greater short-run underpricing as 
well as better long-run return performances, investors armed with the knowledge of the 
issue manager reputation ranking would thus be in a better position to assess whether to 
invest in the stock as well as determine the best time to enter the market given their 
investment horizons and objectives.  
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Second, from the issuers’ perspective, the issue manager reputation ranking offers 
an avenue to negotiate for more favorable terms and conditions with the investment 
banks. Recognizing the signaling effect of issue manager reputation profile, issuers could 
tap on the findings in the study to crave out a more effective message to entice potential 
investors without having to resort to costly marketing efforts and underpricing (Grinblatt 
and Hwang, 1989).  
 
Lastly, from the regulators’ perspective, the pervasive short-run underpricing and 
longer-term underperformance of IPOs would be an area to be reckoned with. To put it 
simply, the short-run underpricing of IPOs is extremely harmful to the efficiency and 
macroeconomic management of the economy. This is because substantial underpricing of 
the IPO firms greatly reduces the amount of capital that the IPO firms could raise and 
potentially hinders the healthy growth of these companies (Saunders and Lim, 1990). To 
resolve this, policy makers must therefore be geared up to devise new measures to limit 
the incentives motivating issue managers to under-price IPOs. Efforts by regulators to 
encourage accurate market pricing would go a long way towards enhancing the efficiency 
of the stock market.  
 
6.3  LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
 The short-run underpricing of IPOs has been widely used as a proxy to measure 
the economic role of issue managers in the IPO process. Following this conventional 
wisdom, the study adopts a similar approach of examining the initial return performance 
of a sample of IPO firms listed on the Singapore Exchange. However, inherent in the 
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initial return measure is the fundamental assumption that the first day closing price of the 
IPO firm truly reflects the intrinsic value of the IPO stock, which is highly contentious 
according to Duffie, et al. (2002) and Logue, et al. (2002). As an alternative to the initial 
return measure, Chemmanur and Krishnan (2007) propose using the sales-based 
valuation multiples and trading activity-based measures to determine the direct 
implications of issue managers reputation in the IPO process. Extending our study to 
investigate the relationship between the issue manager reputation ranking and the 
abovementioned valuation proxies would provide more conclusive evidence on the 
reputational role of the issue managers in Singapore.  
 
 Further, our study analyses the performance of IPO firms in conjunction with the 
performance of comparable firms within the same industry. While the comparable firms 
approach performs very well when a highly comparable group is available, it does not 
preempt against the possibility of the entire industry being subjected to misvaluation 
(Loughran and Ritter, 1995). Chemmanur and Krishnan (2007) argue that the propensity 
score based comparable firm approach could increase the robustness of the match since it 
allows for a finer and more accurate match across many parameters and dimensions. 
Although the match via industrial classification and market capitalization is deemed to be 
adequate for this study and is largely supported by an extensive body of prior literature 
(Boatsman and Baskin, 1981; Ritter, 1991; Alford, 1992), the incorporating of additional 
parameters  (such as the earnings forecasts and ex-post sales growth rate) to the matching 
criteria would be an interesting extension of this research (Kim and Ritter, 1999; 
Chemmanur and Krishnan, 2007).  
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 Finally, the study lays the foundation for subsequent works on the issue manager 
reputational influence in the domestic IPO valuation process. By adopting an overall 
approach, we examine the impact of issue manager reputation on the underpricing and 
underperformance phenomena using a sample of IPOs listed on the Singapore Exchange. 
Differences observed in the issue and issuer characteristics of firms listed on Main Board 
and SESDAQ suggest that the reputational role of issue managers could vary 
substantially across the two unique markets. In view of this, the reputational influence of 
issue managers on the pre-issue valuation and post-issue aftermarket stock performance 
of IPO firms in each of the respective markets deserves further investigation.  
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